Lucien v. Williams

Background

Leonidas Lucien, representing himself, sued Fishkill Correctional Facility Acting Superintendent Emily Williams and Offender Rehabilitation Coordinator Beverly Lockwood under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims against state officials for violating federal rights. The complaint also identified other people who had not been served and had not appeared.

Lucien alleged that, after his release from prison to supervised release, he was kept at a residential treatment facility until SARA-compliant housing was found. He alleged that he was denied access to social media, that defendants were slow to help him find housing, and that an unwritten policy restricted where people could be released. He sought damages and preliminary and permanent injunctions.

Lucien was released from the residential treatment facility on March 1, 2022, to an apartment. The court considered his complaint and first amended petition together because he was representing himself. It also considered his release and parole certificates as documents integral to his allegations, and took judicial notice of a state appellate decision rejecting his challenge to his continued confinement.

Rule 12(b)(6) Motion

Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which asks whether the complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court was required to accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true and to interpret the self-represented plaintiff’s filings liberally, but conclusory allegations were not enough.

Personal Involvement

For damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that each defendant personally participated in the constitutional violation. The court found that Lucien made only conclusory allegations about Williams and Lockwood. He did not identify specific actions Williams took or explain how Lockwood participated in the alleged violations. The court therefore dismissed Lucien’s damages claims against Williams and Lockwood under § 1983.

First Amendment Claim

Lucien alleged that defendants violated the First Amendment by failing to give him access to social media. The court assumed, for purposes of the motion, that he had been completely barred from social media and that the restriction was not a condition of supervised release. Under those assumptions, the court found that he had sufficiently stated a First Amendment claim. But the claim was dismissed without prejudice because Lucien had not adequately alleged the personal involvement of either defendant.

Eighth Amendment Claim

Lucien alleged that defendants violated the Eighth Amendment by holding him beyond the expiration of his sentence. The court concluded that he had not been held beyond his maximum sentence. His supervised-release conditions required him to remain at the residential treatment facility until suitable housing complying with SARA was located, and that period did not extend beyond his supervised-release period. The court also found that Lucien did not allege specific conduct showing deliberate indifference by either defendant. It granted the motion as to this claim.

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim

The court assumed, without deciding, that Lucien had a protected liberty interest in conditional release. It nevertheless found that he had not alleged that he lacked notice of the housing conditions, lacked an explanation for them, or lacked an opportunity to challenge them. His claim challenged the fact of his confinement rather than identifying a specific defect in the process he received. The court granted the motion as to the due-process claim.

Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claim

Lucien alleged that an unwritten policy allowed some sex offenders to be released while requiring others to remain at a residential treatment facility based on their county of conviction or former residence. The court treated this as a possible “class of one” equal-protection claim, meaning a claim that a person was intentionally treated differently from similarly situated people without a rational basis.

The court found that Lucien did not identify a specific person who was nearly identical to him but treated differently. It also stated that, even if he had identified a comparator, the alleged differences could be related to the state’s legitimate interests in ensuring legally permitted housing and avoiding excessive concentrations of sex offenders in particular areas. The court granted the motion as to the equal-protection claim.

Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity can protect government officials from damages when their conduct did not violate clearly established law. The court said it did not need to decide the issue because Lucien had not plausibly alleged a constitutional violation. It also held that, even assuming an Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment violation, the defendants would be protected because the law concerning a constitutional right to release on the conditional-release date was not clearly established in the Second Circuit.

Injunctive Relief

The court denied Lucien’s requests for injunctive relief. Because he had been released from the residential treatment facility, he had not shown a likelihood of future or continuing harm from the alleged confinement. His request to prevent retaliation was unrelated to the allegations in the complaint. His request for documents also did not establish a future harm; the court noted that ordinary discovery procedures could be used if the case proceeded.

Disposition and Further Proceedings

The court stated that defendants’ motion was granted as to Lucien’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims and his requests for injunctive relief. His First Amendment claim was dismissed without prejudice because he had not alleged the personal involvement of any served defendant. The court explained that the dismissal of his claims was without prejudice and allowed him 30 days to file an amended complaint addressing the identified defects. If he did not meet that deadline, the claims dismissed without prejudice could be dismissed with prejudice.

Williams and Lockwood had been served, but Royce and Anne Marie McGrath had not appeared or been served. The court directed the New York State Office of the Attorney General to provide, within 14 days, addresses for service on the Deputy Commissioner of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, Shawn Oliver, and L. Johnson Richardson. The court would issue an order concerning service after receiving that information. Judge Kenneth M. Karas directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the pending motion.