Bamonte v. Charatan

Background

Carol Bamonte, acting as administrator of Kathleen McCormack Durst’s estate, and James McCormack, Virginia McKeon, and Mary Hughes, acting as co-administrators of Anne C. McCormack’s estate, brought a wrongful-death action seeking monetary damages from Debrah Lee Charatan in her capacity as the nominated executor of Robert Durst’s estate. The complaint alleged that Robert Durst murdered Kathleen Durst in South Salem, New York, on January 31, 1982.

A prior related proceeding had dismissed Kathleen Durst’s estate’s wrongful-death claim without prejudice to refiling if a criminal case concerning her death began. In 2021, a felony complaint was filed against Durst, and a grand jury indicted him for Kathleen’s murder. Durst died on January 10, 2022, before he was tried or convicted. The plaintiffs filed this federal wrongful-death action on January 31, 2022.

Charatan moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not adequately state a legal claim. She argued that Durst’s death ended the criminal proceeding from its beginning and eliminated the basis for extending New York’s wrongful-death filing deadline. The plaintiffs argued that New York law does not apply that rule before a criminal defendant has been convicted and that the relevant statutes allowed their action to proceed.

Jurisdiction

The court first considered whether it had authority to hear the case. Because the plaintiffs asserted no federal claims, jurisdiction depended on diversity of citizenship: the parties had to be citizens of different states and the amount in dispute had to exceed $75,000. The court treated Durst as a Texas citizen because that was his domicile before incarceration, and treated Charatan, as the estate’s representative, as a Texas citizen under federal law. The plaintiffs were citizens of New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts, and the complaint alleged that the claim exceeded $75,000. The court therefore found complete diversity.

The court also rejected the argument that the probate exception barred the case. That exception prevents federal courts from probating or annulling wills, administering estates, or taking control of property held by a state probate court. The court held that the plaintiffs sought a money judgment, not an order requiring administration of the estate or control over estate property, so the exception did not eliminate federal jurisdiction.

Statute of Limitations and Abatement

New York generally requires a wrongful-death action to be filed within two years after the decedent’s death. Because Kathleen Durst’s alleged date of death was in 1982, the plaintiffs did not claim that the action was timely under that ordinary deadline. Instead, they relied on New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law § 5-4.1(2), which gives a representative at least one year after the termination of a criminal action to bring a wrongful-death action when a criminal action concerning the same event has begun.

The court explained that “abatement” means the ending of a legal proceeding, and that “abatement from the beginning” treats the proceeding as legally extinguished from its start. New York cases recognize that a convicted defendant’s death while a direct appeal is pending can abate the entire criminal prosecution. But the court found that Charatan had not identified New York authority applying that doctrine before a defendant had been tried or convicted. Durst died after being charged but before trial or conviction.

The court further held that, even if the doctrine could apply before conviction, it would not prevent this lawsuit. The purpose of the doctrine is to protect a criminal defendant’s due-process rights when a conviction cannot receive appellate review. The plaintiffs were not relying on a conviction or indictment to establish Durst’s civil liability. They were relying only on the commencement of the criminal action to trigger a statutory extension of the civil filing deadline. The wrongful-death case would stand or fall on its own merits.

The court also relied on New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law § 11-3.2(a)(1), which states that a wrongful-death claim is not lost because the person allegedly liable for the death has died and that the action may be brought or continued against that person’s representative. The court found this language clear and held that the plaintiffs’ claim was not untimely because of Durst’s death.

Disposition

The court denied Charatan’s motion to dismiss. It concluded that federal jurisdiction existed, the probate exception did not apply, and the abatement doctrine did not prevent the plaintiffs from pursuing their wrongful-death claim under the New York statutes. The court directed the clerk to terminate the pending motion and scheduled a status conference for April 25, 2023.