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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled Mar. 31, 2023

IN RE CARLOTZ, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION

Judge
Ronnie Abrams
Docket
1:21-cv-05906
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
17
SecuritiesCivil ProcedureMotion to DismissClass Action
In one sentence

In re CarLotz Securities Litigation: Judge Abrams granted Defendants’ dismissal motion without prejudice, allowing Plaintiffs 30 days to amend.

Who this affects

The ruling affected the investor Plaintiffs and the CarLotz, Acamar, and related individual and entity Defendants. Plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed without prejudice, with one opportunity to amend within 30 days.

What happened

In IN RE CARLOTZ, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION, investors claimed CarLotz, Acamar, and related defendants made misleading statements before and after their merger about CarLotz’s business and financial risks.

The court ruled that the named investors could not sue over statements about the privately held, pre-merger CarLotz because they did not buy that company’s shares. It also ruled that the investors had not shown that their shares were connected to the challenged registration statement, or that they bought shares directly in an initial public offering, as required for their other claims.

Judge Ronnie Abrams granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss without prejudice. The court dismissed the claims but gave Plaintiffs one opportunity to file an amended complaint within 30 days; it did not decide the merits of the Section 10(b) or related control-person claims.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
IN RE CARLOTZ, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION · No. 1:21-cv-05906
Judge
Ronnie Abrams
Date
Mar. 31, 2023

Background

This securities class action concerned CarLotz, Inc.’s merger with Acamar Partners Acquisition Corporation, a special purpose acquisition company. The merger was completed on January 21, 2021, after Acamar’s registration statement became effective on December 30, 2020. CarLotz then became publicly traded.

Plaintiffs alleged that, before the merger, Pre-Merger CarLotz and its officers made materially false or misleading statements about CarLotz’s consignment-to-retail business model, capital risk, inventory, sourcing partners, and unit economics. Plaintiffs alleged that later disclosures revealed problems involving excess inventory, reconditioning costs, and the loss or pause of a major corporate sourcing partner, followed by declines in CarLotz’s stock price.

Lead Plaintiff David Berger bought shares of Post-Merger CarLotz after the merger. Plaintiff Craig Bailey bought Acamar shares before the merger. Plaintiffs asserted claims under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, and related control-person provisions. Defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim.

Section 10(b) claims

The court held that Plaintiffs could not pursue Section 10(b) claims based on statements that Pre-Merger CarLotz made about itself. Under controlling Second Circuit precedent, a plaintiff must have bought or sold the security about which the challenged misstatement was made. Neither named Plaintiff bought shares of Pre-Merger CarLotz, which was privately held. Bailey bought Acamar shares, and Berger bought Post-Merger CarLotz shares, but Plaintiffs did not establish that Post-Merger CarLotz was legally interchangeable with Pre-Merger CarLotz.

The court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that applying this rule to a special purpose acquisition company transaction created an improper loophole. The court stated that it was bound by the Second Circuit’s decision and would not reach the merits of whether the alleged statements were false, material, or made with the required intent. The court also did not reach the related Section 20(a) control-person claim because it did not decide the underlying Section 10(b) claim.

The court granted Plaintiffs leave to amend the Section 10(b) claim, even though Plaintiffs had previously withdrawn their request for amendment. The court noted Plaintiffs’ assertion that events after the Second Amended Complaint was filed could strengthen their allegations.

Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) claims

For Section 11, the court explained that a plaintiff must be able to trace purchased shares to the allegedly misleading registration statement. Plaintiffs challenged the Form S-4 registration statement that became effective on December 30, 2020. The complaint did not allege that Berger could trace his shares to that statement. Bailey bought Acamar shares before the merger and therefore did not buy them pursuant to the challenged S-4 registration statement. The court held that the merger did not allow Bailey to trace those earlier-purchased shares to the later registration statement.

For Section 12(a)(2), the court held that only a purchaser who bought securities directly in the initial public offering may bring the claim. Plaintiffs did not allege that either Berger or Bailey bought shares in an initial public offering. The court therefore held that they lacked the required right to pursue a Section 12(a)(2) claim. The court also dismissed the related Section 15 control-person claim because control-person liability requires an underlying violation.

Disposition

Judge Ronnie Abrams granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the case without prejudice on the stated standing and pleading grounds, dismissed the Section 11 and 12(a)(2) claims without prejudice, and gave Plaintiffs one opportunity to amend the Second Amended Complaint within 30 days. The court did not decide the merits of the Section 10(b) claims or the related Section 20(a) claim.

The authoritative version

Read the full 17-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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