Gentile v. Crededio
- Laura Swain
- 1:21-cv-08528
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 17
In Gentile v. Crededio, Chief Judge Swain granted Crededio’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ copyright claims.
Gentile and Crawford’s claims against Crededio were dismissed in their entirety; the case continued against Doyle.
What happened
In Gentile v. Crededio, Christopher Gentile and Juan A. Crawford claimed they exclusively authored a draft screenplay and that Cassi Crededio improperly registered it for copyright protection. They sought declarations about ownership and infringement damages or relief, while Crededio asked the court to dismiss the amended complaint.
The court found that the plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged that they were the screenplay’s exclusive authors. Their allegations described ideas, broad concepts, and directions, but did not provide enough detail showing that they created the written expression in the screenplay. The court also found that Crededio’s work was not plausibly a work made for hire because the allegations did not show she was the plaintiffs’ employee.
Chief Judge Laura Taylor Swain granted Crededio’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint in its entirety. Because the plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged ownership of a valid copyright, the court also dismissed their infringement claim. The case continues against Kevin Doyle.
The detailed version
- Gentile v. Crededio · No. 1:21-cv-08528
- Laura Swain
- Mar. 31, 2023
Background
Christopher Gentile and Juan A. Crawford sued Cassi Crededio and Kevin Doyle over a draft screenplay called “Untitled Wyoming Project” or “The Monarch.” The plaintiffs alleged that they were the screenplay’s sole owners and authors, and that Crededio applied for and received a copyright registration without their authorization. They asserted claims seeking declarations about copyright ownership and validity, as well as a copyright-infringement claim.
According to the First Amended Complaint, Gentile conceived the project and worked with Crawford on research, early drafts, and outlines. Crededio was hired for about three weeks, signed a confidentiality agreement, and helped draft the first three acts. The plaintiffs alleged that they gave her instructions and outlines, reviewed her work through screenwriting software, and approved or revised her writing. They also alleged that any original contributions by Crededio were made as work for hire. Crededio was paid $500 for each act she completed by the deadline.
Crededio registered the work after completing the first three acts. The plaintiffs later obtained their own copyright registration and sought declarations that Crededio’s registration was invalid, that theirs was valid, and that they were the exclusive authors and owners.
Legal standard
Crededio moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which asks whether the complaint alleges enough factual matter to state a legally plausible claim. The court accepted non-conclusory factual allegations as true and drew reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor, but it did not accept legal conclusions without supporting facts.
Count One: Declaratory relief
The court treated the plaintiffs’ request for a declaration under the Declaratory Judgment Act as a request for declaratory relief in the copyright dispute, rather than as a separate cause of action. It explained that copyright ownership initially belongs to the author, generally meaning the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression. Ideas, concepts, refinements, and suggestions alone are not copyrightable; the author must independently create an original expression, although the required creativity is minimal.
The court held that the plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged exclusive authorship. Their allegations identified the project’s concept, historical research, characters, settings, plot points, and directions for scenes, but did not identify with enough factual specificity which written elements from their early drafts or outlines were incorporated into the later screenplay. They also did not attach the preliminary drafts or outlines that they claimed to have created.
The court reviewed the screenplay attached to the amended complaint and concluded that many matters the plaintiffs described as their authorship were broad ideas or concepts. The court found that the screenplay contained substantial additional written detail. It also concluded that the plaintiffs’ allegations about having “authored” or “dictated” various portions were often legal conclusions, vague descriptions, or allegations contradicted by the more specific allegations and by the screenplay itself.
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ characterization of Crededio as merely a scribe. Even accepting the allegations as true, the court found that Crededio had helped turn the plaintiffs’ conceptual framework into a written screenplay, drafted sections for their review, and exercised some freedom during the drafting process. The allegations therefore did not support an inference that the plaintiffs alone authored the work.
The court also rejected the alternative work-made-for-hire theory. Under the Copyright Act, a work can be made for hire when it is prepared by an employee within the scope of employment, or when it is specially commissioned and the parties sign a written agreement designating it as a work made for hire. The plaintiffs did not allege a signed work-for-hire agreement, so only the employee theory could potentially apply.
Applying the factors used to distinguish an employee from an independent contractor, the court found the allegations insufficient to show that Crededio was an employee. She worked for about three weeks on one project, received lump-sum payments for completed acts rather than a regular salary, and was not alleged to have received employee benefits or to have had taxes withheld. The plaintiffs alleged control over the screenplay’s composition, but not control over Crededio’s daily activities in the manner of a traditional employer. The court therefore granted Crededio’s motion to dismiss Count One.
Count Two: Copyright infringement
The court also dismissed the copyright-infringement claim. Because the plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged that they authored or owned the work, they had not plausibly alleged ownership of a valid copyright, an element of their infringement claim. The court did not consider the plaintiffs’ argument about contributory infringement because that theory was not asserted in the First Amended Complaint.
Disposition
The court granted Crededio’s motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint against her in its entirety. The order resolved docket entry number 37. The case continued against Doyle and was to be referred to a magistrate judge for general pretrial management.
Read the full 17-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.