United States Court Security Officers v. United States Marshals Service

Background

United States Court Security Officers, the union supporting the individual plaintiffs, and ten Lead Court Security Officers sued the United States Marshals Service under Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act. The individual plaintiffs work under a contract between Centerra, which is not a party to the case, and the Marshals Service. They alleged that the Marshals Service reduced or modified Court Security Officer work hours during the COVID-19 pandemic, causing lost wages or use of accrued paid time off.

After Congress passed the CARES Act, Centerra asked employees to certify that they had not received other government benefits for those losses. Centerra later told employees that the Marshals Service had approved CARES Act reimbursement funds, but said eligibility depended on the Marshals Service’s discretion and interpretation of the law. Centerra distributed the funds to regular Court Security Officers but not to Lead Court Security Officers. The plaintiffs alleged that the Marshals Service directed or otherwise caused that exclusion.

The plaintiffs also submitted a Freedom of Information Act request seeking information about the funding decisions. The Freedom of Information Act claim, identified as Count II, was later dismissed by agreement. The motion addressed in this decision concerned only Count I, the Administrative Procedure Act claim.

The motion to dismiss

The Marshals Service moved to dismiss Count I under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which concerns subject-matter jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6), which concerns whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. It argued that the plaintiffs lacked constitutional standing because Centerra, not the Marshals Service, had decided how to distribute the funds. It also argued that the requested reimbursement was an improper claim for money damages, that the CARES Act did not require the Marshals Service to reimburse Lead Court Security Officers, and that the plaintiffs had not alleged final agency action reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act.

The plaintiffs argued that the Marshals Service had directed Centerra to exclude Lead Court Security Officers. They relied in part on Centerra’s statement that eligibility was determined at the Marshals Service’s sole discretion and that some hours did not satisfy the Marshals Service’s interpretation of the CARES Act. They characterized their requested reimbursement as equitable relief enforcing a statutory obligation, rather than damages for a past injury.

Court’s analysis

The court held that the individual plaintiffs adequately alleged an injury fairly traceable to the Marshals Service. The court gave little weight to a declaration from an agency employee stating that the Marshals Service had never directed Centerra how to allocate the funds because the declaration did not show that the employee had direct personal knowledge of the review, approval, or distribution of the funds. The court also declined to consider statements in the Freedom of Information Act production for their truth at this stage.

The court further held that the plaintiffs’ requested reimbursement did not necessarily constitute money damages barred by sovereign immunity. It treated the claim as one seeking to enforce the CARES Act’s alleged payment requirement. The court explained that although the Act gave an agency discretion to make funds available, once the Marshals Service used that discretion to approve funds for Centerra, the Act required reimbursement of eligible paid or sick leave meeting the statutory conditions.

The court then held that the plaintiffs adequately alleged final agency action. Final agency action generally requires a completed agency decision that determines rights or obligations or produces legal consequences. The complaint alleged that the Marshals Service interpreted the CARES Act, approved Centerra’s application, provided the funds, and determined which employees were eligible. The alleged decision to exclude Lead Court Security Officers from reimbursement was therefore sufficiently final to survive dismissal.

The court emphasized that the Marshals Service denied making any such decision, creating a factual dispute that could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss. It concluded that additional evidence and possible development of the administrative record were needed.

Disposition

Judge Victor Marrero denied the Marshals Service’s motion to dismiss Count I. The Marshals Service was ordered to respond to the complaint within 21 days of the decision. The decision allowed Count I to continue; it did not finally determine whether the Marshals Service’s alleged exclusion of Lead Court Security Officers violated the Administrative Procedure Act.