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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled Apr. 4, 2023

Morrow v. United States

Judge
Victor Marrero
Docket
1:14-cv-01527
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
9
HabeasCriminalCivil Procedure
In one sentence

In Morrow v. United States, Judge Marrero allowed one later challenge to proceed for a government response, but denied another and refused appeal certification.

Who this affects

Neb Morrow’s second or successive challenge was allowed to proceed only on the firearm-conviction ground, while his venue ground was denied. The Government must respond to the firearm ground within 30 days.

What happened

In Morrow v. United States, Neb Morrow asked to file a second challenge under a federal law allowing prisoners to attack their convictions or sentences. The Second Circuit had allowed the filing to go forward for an initial review, and sent it to the district court.

Morrow raised two grounds. He argued that his firearm conviction should be set aside because the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis made the relevant firearm statute’s residual clause unconstitutional, and because his conspiracy conviction could not serve as the required violent-crime basis. He also renewed a venue argument and relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor.

The court found that the firearm claim met the legal requirements for a second challenge and ordered the Government to respond within 30 days. It denied the venue ground because Morrow had raised it before, Taylor did not apply to his conviction, and the ground did not meet the requirements for a second challenge; it also denied a certificate allowing an appeal of that issue. Judge Victor Marrero signed the order.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Morrow v. United States · No. 1:14-cv-01527
Judge
Victor Marrero
Date
Apr. 4, 2023

Background

After a jury trial, Neb Morrow was convicted of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and using a firearm during that conspiracy. He received a total sentence of 147 months: 63 months for the conspiracy conviction and a mandatory consecutive 84 months for the firearm conviction.

Morrow previously appealed his conviction and later filed a first motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a procedure allowing a federal prisoner to challenge a conviction or sentence. The court denied his first motion, including his argument that the case was tried in the wrong federal district. The Second Circuit had also rejected that venue argument on direct appeal.

The Second Circuit later authorized Morrow to file a second or successive § 2255 motion. That authorization meant only that he had made an initial showing that at least one claim might satisfy the statutory requirements. The district court was still required to decide whether each ground actually met those requirements.

Ground One: Firearm conviction

Morrow argued that his firearm conviction could not stand after the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Davis. Davis held that the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which defines some offenses as crimes of violence, was unconstitutionally vague. Morrow’s firearm conviction was based on conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, rather than on a completed Hobbs Act robbery.

The court stated that Morrow appeared correct. It concluded that Davis was a new constitutional rule that applied to Morrow’s collateral challenge and that the conspiracy conviction could not serve as the predicate offense for the firearm charge under the residual clause. The court therefore found that Ground One met the threshold requirements for a second or successive § 2255 motion. It did not vacate the firearm conviction in this order; instead, it directed the Government to respond to that ground within 30 days.

Ground Two: Venue

Morrow renewed his argument that venue was improper because the indictment did not adequately allege criminal conduct in the Southern District of New York. The court held that the argument had already been raised on direct appeal and in Morrow’s first § 2255 motion, and that this history independently supported denial of the new ground.

Morrow relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Taylor. The court explained that Taylor concerned attempted Hobbs Act robbery, while Morrow was convicted of conspiracy and his firearm charge was not based on attempted Hobbs Act robbery. The court therefore found that Taylor did not apply and that Morrow had not identified newly discovered evidence or a new constitutional rule sufficient to satisfy § 2255(h). The court denied the Motion as to Ground Two and denied a certificate of appealability on that issue.

Disposition

Ground One meets the threshold requirements, and the Government must answer it within 30 days. Ground Two fails those requirements, the Motion is denied as to that ground, and no certificate of appealability will issue for it. Judge Victor Marrero entered the order.

The authoritative version

Read the full 9-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
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