Carter v. Sewell
- Rochon
- 1:23-cv-01139
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 2
In Carter v. Sewell, Judge Rochon denied Carter’s motion to vacate the magistrate-judge referral because he had not shown extraordinary circumstances.
Darryl C. Carter’s motion was denied, and the referral of specified proceedings to a magistrate judge remained in place. The court also issued Carter a warning about abusive litigation conduct.
What happened
In Carter v. Sewell, pro se plaintiff Darryl C. Carter asked the court to cancel its referral of certain proceedings to a magistrate judge. He argued that the magistrate judge’s denial of his request for service by publication was wrong and that the referral burdened his constitutional rights.
The court said the standard for canceling a referral is demanding and requires extraordinary circumstances. Even assuming the rule Carter cited applied, the court found that he had not met that standard.
Judge Rochon denied Carter’s motion to vacate the referral. The court also warned Carter not to abuse his opportunity to litigate, referring to several other motions he had already filed.
The detailed version
- Carter v. Sewell · No. 1:23-cv-01139
- Rochon
- Apr. 13, 2023
Background
Darryl C. Carter, proceeding without a lawyer, moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73(b)(3) to vacate, or cancel, the court’s referral of certain proceedings to a magistrate judge. The referral covered general pretrial matters, dispositive motions, and Carter’s then-pending order to show cause concerning the Southern District of New York help desk. Carter objected to the magistrate judge’s denial of his request for service by publication and argued that the referral prejudiced him and burdened his constitutional rights.
Court’s analysis
Rule 73(b)(3) permits a district judge to vacate a referral when a party shows “extraordinary circumstances.” The court described that standard as difficult to satisfy. It also explained that Rule 73 principally concerns a party’s consent to have a magistrate judge handle a case for all purposes, while this case had been referred for certain purposes under a different statutory provision. The court nevertheless assumed, for purposes of its ruling, that Rule 73 applied. After reviewing Carter’s submissions, it found that he had not shown extraordinary circumstances.
Disposition
Judge Jennifer L. Rochon denied Carter’s motion to vacate the referral. The court separately warned Carter not to abuse his opportunity to litigate, citing his motions concerning alleged misconduct by the court’s help desk or PACER facility and alleged problems with the U.S. Marshals Service. The opinion does not state that the court resolved the underlying claims against the defendants.
Read the full 2-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.