United States Court Security Officers v. United States Marshals Service

Background

United States Court Security Officers, Alejandro Acevedo, Frank Forster, Anthony Gatto, Brian Gillespie, Timothy Hertel, Cephas Hunter, Thomas Kaufer, Marta B. Rivera, Robert Ruggiero, and Anthony Venturella sued the United States Marshals Service. The plaintiffs alleged that the Marshals Service violated the Administrative Procedure Act by directing others to exclude Lead Court Security Officers from reimbursements for lost wages and paid time off during the COVID-19 pandemic. The opinion states that the Marshals Service had approved a request for those reimbursements under the CARES Act.

Komatsu’s Motion

Towaki Komatsu, who was representing himself, sought leave to file a motion to intervene. He described his proposed involvement as a challenge to what he viewed as inappropriate treatment by Court Security Officers in federal courthouses, arising from other actions in which he had been involved.

The opinion also states that Komatsu had filed non-party requests, usually motions to intervene, in at least thirteen other actions. Judge Caproni had imposed filing restrictions requiring Komatsu to submit a copy of that order and a one-page declaration explaining his legal interest and why intervention was appropriate before filing documents in cases where he was not a party. Komatsu complied with those prerequisites in this case.

Court’s Analysis

The court considered permissive intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b). That rule allows a timely intervention request when the proposed intervenor has a claim or defense sharing a common question of law or fact with the main action.

The court concluded that Komatsu’s allegations about unfair treatment by Court Security Officers had no connection to whether the Marshals Service excluded the Lead Court Security Officers from CARES Act distributions in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court also rejected Komatsu’s statement that, as a taxpayer, he had an interest because the payments were funded by taxpayers. It explained that taxpayer status generally does not establish standing because an alleged effect on taxes is too abstract.

Disposition

The court stated that permissive intervention is discretionary and that Komatsu’s declaration failed to establish a common legal or factual question with the main action. It therefore found that granting leave to move to intervene would be futile.

Judge Victor Marrero ordered that Komatsu’s motion for leave to move to intervene, Docket Number 34, was DENIED.