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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled May 2, 2023

Forrest v. New York City Housing Authority

Judge
Rochon
Docket
1:22-cv-06480
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
21
EmploymentMotion to DismissCivil Procedure
In one sentence

In Forrest v. New York City Housing Authority, Judge Rochon dismissed retaliatory-discharge claims but allowed suspension-based retaliation claims to continue.

Who this affects

The ruling dismissed Tracy L. Forrest’s retaliatory-discharge claims against NYCHA and the individual defendants, while leaving his other discrimination and retaliation claims, including suspension-based retaliation, in place.

What happened

Tracy L. Forrest sued the New York City Housing Authority and three individual defendants, alleging age- and sex-related discrimination and retaliation under federal, state, and city laws. The defendants asked the court to dismiss only his claims that his separation from employment was retaliation for complaining about discrimination.

Forrest first complained about discrimination on February 11, 2022, after receiving a counseling memo. The court found that the alleged negative employment actions had begun months earlier and that both Forrest’s original complaint and an email showed that the defendants had planned his separation before that complaint. The court therefore found no plausible connection between the complaint and his termination.

Judge Jennifer L. Rochon granted the partial motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part. She dismissed Forrest’s retaliatory-discharge claims, but declined to dismiss his retaliation claims based on his March 4 suspension; his other discrimination and retaliation claims remained.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Forrest v. New York City Housing Authority · No. 1:22-cv-06480
Judge
Rochon
Date
May 2, 2023

Background

Tracy L. Forrest sued his former employer, the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA), along with Lisa Bova-Hiatt, David Rohde, and Haley Stein. He alleged discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The pending motion concerned only his retaliatory-discharge claims, meaning his claims that NYCHA and the individual defendants ended his employment because he complained about discrimination.

Forrest alleged that NYCHA reduced his leadership responsibilities beginning in July

  1. In October 2021, Stein and Rohde criticized his work, removed attorneys and support staff from his supervision, and told him, “we are done with you.” In February 2022, they gave him a counseling memo for allegedly unsatisfactory performance. At the February 11 meeting about that memo, Forrest complained for the first time that he was being subjected to a hostile work environment and discrimination as an older, male supervisor. He later had counsel send NYCHA a discrimination complaint and filed an internal equal-opportunity complaint on March 3,
  2. NYCHA suspended him with pay on March 4 and informed him that his employment would be terminated on April
  3. Forrest submitted retirement papers on April 1, and his separation took effect.

Motion and legal standard

The defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether the complaint alleges enough facts to support a legally plausible claim. To plead retaliation, a plaintiff generally must allege protected activity, the defendants’ knowledge of that activity, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection between the activity and the action. The court noted that the state and city laws apply more liberal standards in some respects, but still require that the challenged conduct result from the protected activity.

Documents and earlier pleading

The court considered a February 10, 2022 email because the Second Amended Complaint referred to and quoted it, and Forrest possessed and relied on it. The email referred to a planned separation meeting, a separation agreement being finalized, a counseling memo to be delivered before that meeting, and preparations for the effects of Forrest’s separation.

The court also considered an allegation in Forrest’s original complaint stating that the decision to terminate his employment “had already been made” before the February 11 counseling meeting. The court found that the Second Amended Complaint directly contradicted that allegation by asserting that the defendants were only considering termination at that time. Because the earlier allegation was a direct factual contradiction rather than merely an omitted or clarified allegation, the court treated the original allegation as controlling for purposes of the motion.

Retaliatory-discharge claims

The court held that the Second Amended Complaint did not plausibly allege causation. First, the alleged negative employment actions began months before Forrest’s February 11 protected activity. The court reasoned that the gradual reduction of his responsibilities, removal of supervisory duties, criticism of his work, and counseling memo undermined an inference that his eventual separation resulted from his later discrimination complaint.

Second, the original complaint’s statement that the termination decision had already been made before the first protected activity independently defeated causation. Third, the February 10 email showed that the defendants had planned the separation process before Forrest complained. The court rejected Forrest’s argument that causation required an unequivocal notice of termination after his complaint. It also rejected his argument that the defendants’ failure to investigate his complaint or reconsider the separation decision created a retaliation claim, explaining that failure to investigate or maintain the existing decision was not itself punishment for making the complaint.

For these reasons, the court dismissed the retaliatory-discharge claims under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. It also dismissed the retaliatory-discharge claims under the New York State and New York City human-rights laws because Forrest had not plausibly alleged that his termination occurred as a result of his protected activity.

Suspension and remaining claims

The court declined to dismiss the retaliation claims based on Forrest’s March 4 suspension. The suspension occurred one day after he filed his internal complaint, and the defendants’ motion was limited to the retaliatory-discharge claims. The court therefore left those suspension-based claims in place on the record before it.

Disposition

Judge Jennifer L. Rochon granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ partial motion to dismiss. The court dismissed Forrest’s retaliatory-discharge claims. It did not dismiss the retaliation claims based on his suspension, and Forrest’s other discrimination and retaliation claims remained. The opinion did not add a prejudice designation to the dismissal.

The authoritative version

Read the full 21-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
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