Aaron v. Keyser

Background

Shavon Aaron, proceeding without a lawyer, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law that allows people to sue for certain constitutional violations by state officials. Aaron alleged that, during visits with her husband at Green Haven Correctional Facility, Correction Officer S. Keyser and a canine searched her. She alleged that the dog put its nose in her crotch area, touched her outer leg, and bit her buttocks. She further alleged that Keyser, Correction Officer Preston, and Sergeant Malark did not obtain medical attention for her, did not document her injuries, retaliated against her complaints, threatened her future visits, issued a false disciplinary report against her husband, and allowed food and clothing to be taken from packages she sent to him.

Aaron’s amended complaint asserted twelve claims against various defendants, including Commissioner Annucci, the Director of the Office of Special Investigations, the Superintendent, Keyser, Preston, Malark, and the dog. In an earlier order, the court had dismissed claims against the Superintendent and the Director of the Office of Special Investigations for lack of personal involvement and dismissed claims against the dog because it was not a person who could be sued under § 1983. The court issued summonses for Keyser, Preston, and Malark, but only Preston and Malark were served.

Motion to Dismiss

Preston, Malark, and Keyser moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6). These rules address, respectively, the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, service of process, and whether the complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court declined to consider documents Aaron submitted with her opposition because they were not part of, or integral to, the amended complaint and some contained hearsay.

The court rejected the defendants’ argument that Aaron lacked standing to bring her retaliation claims. It held that Aaron plausibly alleged injuries to herself, including denial of medical treatment, threats that she could not return to visit, and loss of items she sent to her husband. The court also held that retaliatory conduct directed at a close family member can, in some circumstances, affect the family member who brought the complaint.

Service and Defendant-Specific Rulings

The court dismissed the claims against the Superintendent and the Director of the Office of Special Investigations because Aaron had not corrected the deficiencies identified in the earlier order and had not served those defendants. The court also dismissed the claims against the dog. Because claims one, four, nine, ten, and eleven were brought only against those defendants and Commissioner Annucci, the court dismissed those claims in their entirety. Claim nine, which was brought only against Annucci, was separately dismissed by the court on its own initiative under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution. The court also stated that claims against Annucci in his individual capacity failed because Aaron did not allege his personal involvement.

The court dismissed the claims against Keyser for deficient service of process. Aaron had received extensions of time to serve him, but no proof of service had been filed by the deadline. The court concluded that her assertions about delays by the Clerk’s Office and the U.S. Marshals did not establish good cause because she had been told that she was not entitled to Marshal assistance. Claims two, seven, and twelve, which were asserted only against Keyser and/or the previously dismissed Director, were therefore dismissed. The court additionally stated that claim twelve would fail on the merits because the alleged canine sniff at the prison did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.

Merits of the Remaining Claims

The court dismissed claim three, which alleged deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. It concluded that the alleged dog bite, pain, swelling, puncture marks, headaches, fever, and emotional effects did not satisfy the requirement that the injury be objectively serious enough to receive constitutional protection. The court also concluded that Aaron did not allege facts showing that the defendants knowingly disregarded a serious and urgent medical risk. The approximately one-hour delay in receiving care was not sufficiently extreme under the circumstances described. Claim eight, alleging failure to document injuries, was dismissed for the same reasons, and the court also held that failure to investigate or document an injury, by itself, is not a constitutional claim.

The court dismissed claims five and six, which alleged retaliation for Aaron’s complaints and threats to sue. It held that Aaron’s complaints concerned her personal experience and were not speech on a matter of public concern protected by the First Amendment. The court also held that requests for medical care were not, by themselves, protected activity for purposes of these retaliation claims. Separately, the court concluded that Aaron had not plausibly alleged an injury caused by retaliation: she continued to complain to prison officials and continued visiting her husband, did not allege that the medical delay worsened her condition, and the alleged loss of food and clothing was too minor to support the claim.

Disposition

The court stated that the motion to dismiss was granted with prejudice as to claims three, five, six, and eight, and without prejudice as to claims one, two, four, seven, nine, ten, eleven, and twelve. The court denied leave to file a second amended complaint because Aaron had already amended once and had supplemented her allegations in opposition to the motion, making further amendment futile. The court also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith, denied fee-free appeal status, directed the Clerk to close the case, and directed that a copy of the order be mailed to Aaron.