Rhee-Karn v. Lask

Background

An earlier summary-judgment ruling found that Susan Chana Lask committed legal malpractice in connection with the First Federal Action but did not commit malpractice in connection with the Second Federal Action. That ruling determined liability; a jury trial scheduled for July 2023 would determine damages, specifically the legal fees attributable to the First Federal Action.

The court ruled on Margaret Rhee-Karn’s motion in limine and Lask’s omnibus motion in limine. Each motion was GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Rhee-Karn’s Motion

The court granted Rhee-Karn’s request to prevent Lask from arguing or presenting evidence that Lask did not commit malpractice in connection with the First Federal Action. The prior liability ruling had been upheld after reconsideration was denied and after an appeal. The court found no basis to disregard that ruling.

The court denied Rhee-Karn’s request to use a broader damages period. The relevant period is October 24, 2012, through February 5, 2013, when the First Federal Action was dismissed. Rhee-Karn’s counsel had agreed during an earlier hearing to remove billing entries outside that period, and the court held Rhee-Karn to that concession. The jury’s only damages task is to decide which entries within that period reflect work performed in connection with the First Federal Action.

The court denied Rhee-Karn’s request to treat statements in Lask’s appellate briefing as binding admissions about the billing records. The jury may evaluate Lask’s credibility, and Rhee-Karn may confront Lask with those statements. Excerpts from the appellate briefing may be admitted at trial as described in the order.

Lask’s Omnibus Motion

The court denied Lask’s request to strike Rhee-Karn’s proposed pretrial order and adopt Lask’s proposed order in full. The court would not approve either proposed order and would issue its own orders as needed.

The court barred Lask from presenting arguments or evidence based on ratification, unclean hands, waiver, or failure to pay. The court stated that liability had already been determined and that Lask was not claiming that Rhee-Karn failed to pay her bills. The court did not preclude a set-off theory based on credits Lask may have given Rhee-Karn for work connected to the First Federal Action, provided evidence supports the claimed credits.

The court did not rule at that time on whether fees Rhee-Karn incurred in this litigation, including portions of an appeal, could be recovered as damages. It stated that the issue could be addressed if a request for attorney’s fees is made after trial. The court also did not decide whether Rhee-Karn could receive pre-judgment interest. It held that the issue would be decided by the court, not the jury, in post-trial briefing.

The court granted Lask’s request to revise the caption so that Lask would be identified solely as “SUSAN CHANA LASK, ESQ.” Rhee-Karn may not refer to Lask as having other names at trial without a prior court order.

The court denied Lask’s request to bar statements that Lask committed legal malpractice. It granted in part Lask’s request concerning the appellate mandate by limiting what could be argued to the jury: the jury would not be told what the appellate court held or did not hold, but Lask could not argue that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction or made an error. The jury would be told that Lask’s malpractice in connection with the First Federal Action had already been determined.

The court denied Lask’s request to bar Rhee-Karn from presenting damages evidence. Rhee-Karn could present a damages calculation and supporting evidence, but only for the October 24, 2012, through February 5, 2013 period.

The court granted Lask’s request to exclude Paul H. Friedlander’s report and testimony. The report was served on the last day of expert discovery, depriving Lask of an opportunity to depose Friedlander and serve a rebuttal report. The court also found that the proposed opinions would not help the jury decide which work Lask billed in connection with the First Federal Action and what damages resulted.

The court granted Lask’s request to strike Friedlander from the witness list but otherwise denied the request to strike Rhee-Karn’s witnesses. The court sustained objections to the marked Third Amended Complaint and Lask’s Second Circuit mandate as trial exhibits. It sustained the objection to Lask’s Amended Answer but allowed its use for impeachment. It sustained in part the objection to Lask’s appellate brief, allowing legible excerpts about specific billing entries. The court deferred rulings on Lask’s invoices, interrogatory answers, and a Family Court transcript until the parties provided more information. Jury-instruction disputes would be addressed at a later charging conference.

Additional Damages Theories

The court barred a theory that the First Federal Action was a strategic effort to prompt action in state family court because that theory conflicted with the established finding that filing the action without appropriate research was malpractice. The court again stated that a set-off based on actual credits might be allowed if supported by evidence. The court ordered further briefing on whether work performed for the First Federal Action was or would have been used for the Second Federal Action.