Link Motion Inc. v. DLA Piper LLP
- Victor Marrero
- 1:22-cv-08313
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 21
In Link Motion v. DLA Piper, Judge Marrero dismissed Link Motion’s malpractice suit with prejudice as time-barred.
Link Motion Inc.’s legal-malpractice claims against DLA Piper LLP (US) and Caryn G. Schechtman were dismissed with prejudice, ending this action.
What happened
In Link Motion Inc. v. DLA Piper LLP (US), Link Motion claimed that DLA Piper and Caryn G. Schechtman mishandled an emergency proceeding involving a shareholder lawsuit and receiver appointment. Link Motion said DLA Piper should have raised defenses and opposed the requested relief.
The court ruled that the malpractice claim accrued no later than January 21, 2019, when DLA Piper signed an agreement stating that Link Motion would not oppose the requested preliminary injunction. The court rejected Link Motion’s arguments that the time limit was extended by continuing legal representation, pandemic-related New York orders, or the receiver’s control of the company.
Judge Victor Marrero granted DLA Piper’s motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice because the claim was filed after the three-year deadline. The court expressly decided the motion on the time-limit issue and did not address whether Link Motion adequately pleaded malpractice.
The detailed version
- Link Motion Inc. v. DLA Piper LLP · No. 1:22-cv-08313
- Victor Marrero
- May 26, 2023
Background
Link Motion Inc. sued DLA Piper LLP (US) and Caryn G. Schechtman for legal malpractice. DLA Piper had advised Link Motion about a Class B shares transaction and later made a limited appearance for Link Motion in a related shareholder action, Baliga v. Link Motion Inc.
In that related action, Wayne Baliga sought emergency relief, including a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and appointment of a receiver. Link Motion alleged that Baliga was not a registered shareholder under Cayman Islands law and therefore lacked authority to bring a derivative action for the company. Link Motion claimed that DLA Piper failed to advise it about this and other defenses, did not adequately oppose Baliga’s requests, and signed a January 21, 2019 stipulation stating that Link Motion did not oppose the preliminary injunction. The court later entered the preliminary injunction and appointed a receiver. DLA Piper withdrew from representing Link Motion on March 1, 2019.
Link Motion alleged that the receiver’s actions caused it financial harm, including litigation and receivership expenses, lost business benefits, and other losses. It filed this malpractice action on September 12, 2022. DLA Piper removed the case from New York state court and moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. The parties agreed that the court could decide the motion based on their pre-motion letters.
Statute of Limitations
The court held that New York law gives a legal-malpractice claim a three-year limitations period. Such a claim generally accrues on the date of the allegedly improper act, not when the plaintiff discovers the alleged malpractice.
The court determined that the claim accrued no later than January 21, 2019, when DLA Piper signed the stipulation. It rejected Link Motion’s argument that the continuous-representation doctrine delayed accrual until March 1, 2019. That doctrine can delay the limitations period while an attorney continues representing a client on the specific matter, but the court found that DLA Piper’s representation was limited, effectively ended within days of the stipulation, and lacked an ongoing relationship of trust and confidence.
The court stated that, under ordinary circumstances, the three-year period expired on January 21, 2022. Even assuming that New York Executive Order 202.8 extended the period by 228 days, the deadline would have been September 5, 2022—one week before Link Motion filed suit. The court also said it was not persuaded that the executive order applied to these claims.
Equitable Tolling
Link Motion alternatively argued that equitable tolling should apply because the receiver repeatedly refused to bring the malpractice claim while controlling the company. Equitable tolling can prevent a limitations period from expiring when a plaintiff diligently pursues its rights but an extraordinary circumstance prevents a timely filing.
The court assumed, without deciding, that Link Motion had pursued its rights diligently. It nevertheless found no qualifying extraordinary circumstance. The alleged obstruction came from the receiver, who was not a defendant in this case, and Link Motion did not allege that DLA Piper prevented it from learning the relevant facts or filing suit.
The court also rejected applying adverse domination, a theory that can toll a limitations period when people who allegedly harmed an entity completely control it and make a lawsuit impossible. The court concluded that the theory generally applies against the controlling wrongdoers, not a nonparty such as the receiver. It further found that the receiver’s refusal to bring the action reflected a disagreement about whether the claim should be pursued, rather than the kind of fraudulent wrongdoing covered by the theory.
Disposition
The court held that Link Motion’s malpractice action was time-barred. It expressly decided the motion on statute-of-limitations grounds alone and did not otherwise address whether the complaint adequately stated a malpractice claim. Judge Victor Marrero granted DLA Piper and Schechtman’s motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice and directed the Clerk of Court to close the action.
Read the full 21-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.