Jacob v. Lorenz

Background

Ariadna Jacob and Influences, Inc. brought a libel action against Taylor Lorenz and The New York Times Company based on statements in an August 14, 2020 article about Jacob’s influencer-management business and several influencer houses. The plaintiffs alleged that the article contained false statements and harmed their business and Jacob personally.

After the court dismissed the first amended complaint, it gave the plaintiffs limited permission to amend their defamation allegations concerning five statements. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint that also included a new defamation allegation about utilities and new claims for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants moved to dismiss the second amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim based on its allegations.

Legal standards

Because the lawsuit involved public participation under New York’s anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation statute, the plaintiffs had to plausibly allege actual malice to seek damages. Actual malice means that the defendants knew a statement was false or recklessly disregarded whether it was false. The court also considered whether the plaintiffs adequately alleged defamation by implication, which requires a strong showing that the article reasonably conveyed a defamatory meaning and suggested that the author intended or endorsed that meaning.

The court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion, but it did not have to accept conclusory statements. The court emphasized that a motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the pleading, not whether the plaintiffs would ultimately win.

Defamation claims

The court dismissed the claim concerning Statement 3, about an increased share of rent allegedly demanded from influencers at the KND house. The plaintiffs’ denials and other allegations did not plausibly show that Lorenz or The New York Times Company knew the statement was false or seriously doubted its truth. The court also rejected the defamation-by-implication theory for this statement.

The court dismissed the claim concerning Statement 8, which quoted statements that Jacob had promised brand deals, money, and opportunities. The plaintiffs alleged that information existed that could have contradicted the article, but they did not allege facts showing that Lorenz knew that information or had serious doubts about the statement. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs had not adequately pleaded defamation by implication.

The court dismissed the claim concerning Statement 9, about a security camera in the kitchen of an influencer house. The plaintiffs alleged that people entering the house signed releases mentioning video surveillance and that the defendants knew about the surveillance. But the court found that these allegations did not show that the defendants knew the specific statement was false or recklessly disregarded its truth. The defamation-by-implication theory also failed.

The court denied the motion as to Statement 12, concerning Jacob’s alleged leaking of Devion Young’s nude photographs. The court found that prepublication communications showed Lorenz understood that people accused Jacob of privately distributing the photographs but that no one alleged she had publicly leaked them. Despite that understanding, the article included a quotation stating that Jacob had leaked the photographs. The court held that these allegations were sufficient to allow the defamation claim to proceed at the pleading stage.

The court dismissed the claim concerning Statement 14, about Jacob’s alleged management relationship with Ellie Zeiler. The plaintiffs alleged that Ellie appeared on an informational slide deck with her mother’s consent and that they had told Lorenz there was no management contract. The court held that these allegations did not plausibly show that the defendants knew the published statement was false or acted with actual malice. The defamation-by-implication theory also failed.

The court dismissed the new defamation claim concerning utilities at the Girls in the Valley house. The parties agreed that the utilities had been shut off. Although they disputed whether the shutoff occurred in March or April and who was responsible for paying, the court held that the alleged timing difference did not make the article materially false. The article also included the plaintiffs’ explanation that Jacob was not responsible for the utilities after she moved out. The court therefore rejected both the falsity theory and the defamation-by-implication theory.

New tort claims

The court dismissed the tortious-interference claim. It held that the claim merely restated the plaintiffs’ defamation allegations and therefore was duplicative. The plaintiffs also failed to identify specific contracts or business relationships with which the defendants allegedly interfered and did not adequately plead the required improper purpose.

The court dismissed the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. It held that this claim also duplicated the defamation allegations. In addition, the complaint’s assertions that the defendants’ conduct was outrageous were conclusory and lacked enough supporting facts.

Disposition

The court denied the plaintiffs’ request to file a third amended complaint, finding that further amendment would be futile after two opportunities to plead the claims and the court’s earlier explanation of their defects. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss the second amended complaint. The defamation allegations concerning Statements 3, 8, 9, and 14 and the utilities statement were dismissed with prejudice. The tortious-interference and intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims were also dismissed with prejudice. The motion was denied as to the defamation claim concerning Statement 12. The parties’ requests for oral argument were denied as moot.