Mears v. Scherer

Background

Steven Mears, who was proceeding without a lawyer, brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute. He sued former New York Supreme Court Justice Micki A. Scherer, Acting New York Supreme Court Justice Edward J. McLaughlin, Acting New York Supreme Court Justice A. Kirke Bartley, and the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

Mears’s allegations concerned his New York criminal proceedings and later postconviction motions. He challenged the denial of a speedy-trial motion, alleged failures to decide some postconviction motions, challenged the denial of other postconviction motions, and alleged that the Appellate Division failed to provide requested relief. He sought injunctive and declaratory relief, including orders requiring the defendants to undo earlier decisions and grant relief he had previously requested. He also asked the court to convert the complaint into a federal petition challenging his conviction if the § 1983 action was not the proper procedure.

The court had previously allowed Mears to proceed without prepaying filing fees. Under the screening rules for such cases, the court had to dismiss claims that were frivolous, failed to state a claim, sought relief from an immune defendant, or fell outside the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.

Claims Against the Appellate Division

The court dismissed all claims against the Appellate Division for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment. That amendment generally protects states and state instrumentalities from suits in federal court unless immunity has been waived or removed by Congress. The court held that the Appellate Division is part of the New York State Unified Court System and therefore is an arm of New York State. The court stated that New York had not waived its immunity and Congress had not removed it for § 1983 claims. The dismissal covered Mears’s claims for injunctive relief and retrospective declaratory relief.

Claims for Injunctive Relief Against the Individual Judges

The court dismissed Mears’s claims for injunctive relief against the individual judges under judicial immunity and treated those claims as frivolous for purposes of the filing-fee statute. Judicial immunity generally protects judges from civil suits based on acts performed as part of their judicial responsibilities, even when a plaintiff alleges bad faith or improper motive. The court found that Mears’s claims arose from the judges’ actions, failures to act, and decisions concerning his criminal-trial and postconviction motions.

The court also explained that § 1983 generally does not allow injunctive relief against a judge for a judicial act unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. It found that declaratory relief was available through state-court appeals. The court concluded that Mears’s allegations did not show that either recognized exception to judicial immunity applied: action outside a judge’s judicial role or action taken without any jurisdiction.

Claims for Declaratory Relief Against the Individual Judges

The court dismissed Mears’s claims for declaratory relief against the individual judges under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. That doctrine prevents a federal district court from reviewing or overturning a final state-court judgment when the federal plaintiff lost in state court, attributes the injury to that judgment, asks the district court to reject it, and the state judgment came before the federal case.

The court held that Mears’s requests for declarations challenged the individual judges’ final decisions concerning his speedy-trial and postconviction motions. Because those requests effectively sought federal district-court review of state-court decisions, the court concluded that Rooker-Feldman barred them.

Request to Convert the Case Into a Federal Conviction Challenge

The court declined to convert the complaint into a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the federal procedure for challenging a state conviction or custody. Section 2254 requires the petitioner to be in custody under the state judgment. The court stated that Mears had been released from prison and post-release supervision before filing this action, so he was no longer in custody when he filed it.

The court noted that, if Mears had still been in custody, it would have treated the filing as a second or successive petition and transferred it to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit because Mears had previously challenged the same conviction through federal petitions. The court did not convert or transfer this action because Mears was no longer in custody.

Leave to Amend and Disposition

The court declined to allow Mears to amend his complaint because it concluded that the defects could not be cured by amendment. It dismissed the action; dismissed all claims against the Appellate Division for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on Eleventh Amendment immunity; dismissed the claims for injunctive relief against the individual judges based on judicial immunity and as frivolous; and dismissed the claims for declaratory relief against the individual judges for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman.

The court also denied Mears permission to proceed without paying filing fees for an appeal, certifying that any appeal would not be taken in good faith, and directed the Clerk of Court to enter judgment.