Waterman v. Nolan

Background

Rory Waterman and Marniqua Tompkins, representing themselves, sued Katheleen E. Nolan and Fourth Lenox Terrace Associates LLC. The complaint concerned an eviction proceeding that Nolan initiated on behalf of Fourth Lenox in the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County, Housing Part. The plaintiffs alleged that efforts to remove them from their apartment violated their constitutional due-process rights. They sought damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims against a person who deprives someone of constitutional rights while acting under state law. They also asserted state-law claims for abuse of process and identity theft.

Federal Civil-Rights Claim

The court explained that § 1983 generally does not reach purely private conduct. A private person or entity can be treated as a state actor only when the challenged conduct is fairly attributable to the state, such as through collaboration with a state actor or a sufficiently close connection between the state and the conduct.

The court concluded that the complaint identified both defendants as private actors: Fourth Lenox was a private landlord, and Nolan was a private attorney. The complaint did not allege that either defendant collaborated or conspired with a state actor. The facts that Fourth Lenox was registered to do business in New York, Nolan held a state-issued law license, and Fourth Lenox allegedly received federal financial assistance and was subject to federal housing regulations did not establish state action. The court therefore dismissed the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim.

State-Law Claims and Disposition

The dismissal of the § 1983 claim removed the only claim giving the federal court original jurisdiction. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the court’s authority to hear related state-law claims—in the absence of a remaining federal claim. It therefore dismissed the abuse-of-process and identity-theft claims for lack of jurisdiction.

The court stated that claims in a self-represented complaint should generally be dismissed without prejudice when the allegations might be amended to state a valid claim. It dismissed the complaint without prejudice and allowed the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint within 30 days of the decision. Any amended complaint would need specific, concrete, and plausible allegations showing a basis for federal jurisdiction. The clerk was directed to mail the opinion and an attached legal-clinic flyer to the self-represented plaintiffs.