Doe v. The Trustee of Columbia University in The City of New York

Background

Jane Doe, proceeding without a lawyer, sued The Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York and three individual defendants under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. She alleged that Columbia failed to properly handle her report that another Columbia student, identified in the opinion as John Roe, sexually assaulted her in a university dormitory on January 8, 2019.

Doe formally reported the alleged assault to Columbia’s Gender-Based Misconduct Office on August 3, 2019. Columbia sent Doe and Roe notice letters, issued a no-contact directive, connected Doe with a lawyer at no cost, and investigated the allegations. Investigators interviewed Doe, Roe, and five witnesses and reviewed electronic communications, social-media posts, medical and advocacy records, written statements, and other evidence. Their report recommended that Roe be found not responsible for sexual assault and that Doe be found not responsible for stalking and violating the no-contact directive. A hearing panel later affirmed the report’s findings. Doe did not attend the hearing and did not appeal the decision.

After the court dismissed Doe’s first amended complaint in August 2022, it allowed limited amendment. Doe filed a second amended complaint asserting one Title IX claim based on deliberate indifference. She alleged that Columbia improperly handled evidence concerning trauma responses, used an unclear policy, denied her the opportunity to present additional evidence and witnesses, and failed to protect her access to Columbia’s main library. Columbia moved to dismiss the second amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not allege enough facts to state a legally plausible claim.

Legal Standard

Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in educational programs receiving federal financial assistance. Under the deliberate-indifference standard, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the school had actual knowledge of sexual harassment, that the harassment was severe and offensive enough to deprive the plaintiff of access to educational opportunities or benefits, and that the school’s response was clearly unreasonable in light of what it knew.

At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the court accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences for the plaintiff. The court does not decide whether the plaintiff will ultimately win or weigh disputed evidence. The same standard applies to a plaintiff proceeding without a lawyer, although such pleadings are read liberally.

Court’s Analysis

The court found that Columbia had actual knowledge of the alleged assault when Doe formally reported it on August 3, 2019. But it concluded that Doe had not plausibly alleged that she was deprived of educational opportunities or benefits. Doe alleged that she stopped using Columbia’s main library because she encountered Roe there daily from January through April 2019. The court emphasized that this period preceded Doe’s formal report to Columbia and that she had access to almost two dozen other university libraries.

The court also concluded that Doe had not plausibly alleged that Columbia’s response was clearly unreasonable. The court noted that Doe did not claim that the investigation was untimely. It found that Columbia acted immediately after receiving the formal complaint, followed a comprehensive policy, investigated the allegations, reviewed the evidence described in the investigative report, and provided an opportunity to appeal. Doe did not use that appeal opportunity. The court explained that Title IX did not require Columbia to use Doe’s preferred investigative process or provide particular remedial measures.

Disposition

The court held that Doe failed to plausibly plead her single deliberate-indifference claim. It further held that another amendment would be futile because Doe had already had three opportunities to assert her claims and had previously been informed of defects in her allegations. The court therefore granted Columbia’s motion to dismiss the second amended complaint and dismissed that complaint with prejudice. It directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the motion and close the case. The opinion also notes that the claims against the individual defendants had previously been dismissed because Title IX does not authorize suits against them.