Malcolm v. City of New York
- Andrew Carter
- 1:20-cv-09641
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 8
In Malcolm v. City of New York, Judge Carter denied the City’s motion to dismiss overtime claims as untimely under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
The ruling allows Omar Malcolm, the other named plaintiffs, and the affected opt-in employees to continue pursuing the challenged overtime claims at this stage; it does not resolve whether the City ultimately violated the Fair Labor Standards Act or whether the claims will succeed.
What happened
Omar Malcolm and 23 other New York City employees sued the City in a Fair Labor Standards Act collective action, alleging that they were not paid overtime or were paid late. They sought overtime wages for work performed during the period covered by the law’s extended three-year limit for willful violations.
The City asked the court to dismiss claims from before November 17, 2018, arguing that the employees had not adequately alleged that the City knowingly or recklessly violated the overtime law. It also sought dismissal of claims by opt-in employees who had not pleaded facts about overtime violations during the relevant period. The employees pointed to complaints about overtime made to City officials and earlier similar lawsuits against the City.
The court denied the City’s partial motion to dismiss. It ruled that the allegations plausibly suggested a willful violation, allowing the three-year period to remain available at this stage, and declined to resolve the opt-in employees’ individual time-period issues. Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. issued the ruling.
The detailed version
- Malcolm v. City of New York · No. 1:20-cv-09641
- Andrew Carter
- June 30, 2023
Background
Omar Malcolm and 23 other named plaintiffs, who are New York City employees working as Correction Officers, Captains, and Assistant Deputy Wardens, brought a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). They alleged that the City of New York failed to pay overtime wages, or failed to pay them on time, at one and one-half times their regular rate of pay. The complaint alleged that the City’s conduct was widespread, repeated, and consistent.
The FLSA generally provides a two-year limitations period for wage claims. If an employer’s violation was willful—meaning the employer knew, or recklessly disregarded, that its conduct was prohibited—the period may extend to three years. The City sought dismissal with prejudice of claims beyond November 17, 2018, and of claims by plaintiffs who had not pleaded facts concerning violations before that date.
The City’s Motion
The City moved for partial dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint contains enough factual allegations to plausibly support a legal claim. The City argued that the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged willfulness and that certain opt-in plaintiffs had not pleaded facts covering the periods needed to preserve their claims.
The plaintiffs alleged that Malcolm repeatedly complained about unpaid or late-paid overtime to timekeepers, the central timekeeping unit, the payroll department, supervisors, the Labor Relations Unit, and other City officials. They also relied on similar FLSA lawsuits against the City as support for an inference that the City was aware of potential violations.
Court’s Analysis
The court held that the plaintiffs had alleged enough facts to create a plausible inference of willfulness at the pleading stage. The court emphasized the allegations describing repeated complaints, including a June 2, 2020 email in which Malcolm stated that he had not received overtime wages and that this violated the FLSA. Although the plaintiffs attached only one email and did not provide the other communications they described, the court found their accounts sufficiently detailed for the claims to proceed at this stage.
The court also noted that earlier similar FLSA lawsuits against the City could support an inference that the City had notice of allegedly unlawful overtime practices. It stated that willfulness is generally left for the factfinder—the person or group deciding disputed facts—rather than resolved on a motion to dismiss.
As to the opt-in plaintiffs, the court explained that the limitations period can stop at different times depending on whether a person was a named plaintiff or later joined the collective action by filing written consent. The court declined to determine at that stage which specific periods each opt-in plaintiff would claim or whether particular allegations were timely.
Disposition
The court denied the City’s partial motion to dismiss. It specifically denied the request to dismiss claims beyond November 17, 2018 and denied the request to dismiss certain opt-in plaintiffs’ claims based on their alleged failure to plead facts from the relevant period.
The opinion refers to the motion as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, but one passage calls it a motion for partial summary judgment. The opinion also gives both November 17, 2020 and November 17, 2018 as dates associated with the initial complaint; the ruling consistently addresses November 17, 2018 as the relevant cutoff.
Read the full 8-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.