Harris v. Denully

Background

Laquan Devota Harris, representing himself, brought the action under the court’s federal-question jurisdiction. He alleged that Shane Denully, Michael Jordan, Michael Hernandez, Neil Greenwell, Juan Merchant, Mearidith T. Christopher, and Rosemary Vasallo violated his Fourth Amendment rights, committed perjury, gave false testimony, plotted to falsely accuse him of unspecified crimes, and stole his property. He also alleged that he was sexually assaulted in a bathroom at the “40th command” in the Bronx and that Police Officer Jordan used physical force against him while he was handcuffed. Harris sought money damages.

The alleged events occurred on November 19, 2018. Harris filed this complaint on May 30, 2023. The court had previously allowed him to proceed without paying filing fees in advance. Because he was proceeding without a lawyer, the court read his allegations liberally, but it explained that his complaint still had to provide enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief.

Court’s analysis

The court treated the complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a law that permits claims for violations of federal rights by people acting under state authority. The court concluded that the complaint did not provide enough facts to state viable Section 1983 claims.

The court also found that the claims appeared to be untimely. Section 1983 claims in New York generally have a three-year limitations period, and the court determined that Harris’s claims accrued on November 19, 2018. Because the complaint was filed more than four years later, the court allowed Harris to provide facts showing why the claims should not be barred by the limitations period.

The court separately addressed the named defendants:

- Rosemary Vasallo: The court stated that a Legal Aid attorney is ordinarily a private party rather than a state actor for Section 1983 purposes. Because Harris did not allege that Vasallo worked for a state or other government body, he did not state a Section 1983 claim against her. - Judge Juan Merchant: The court held that judges are absolutely immune from damages claims for actions taken within their judicial responsibilities. Harris did not allege facts showing that Merchant acted outside his judicial role or jurisdiction. The court dismissed these claims as seeking monetary relief from an immune defendant and consequently as frivolous under the federal filing-fee statute. - Assistant District Attorney Neil Greenwell: The court held that prosecutors are absolutely immune from damages claims for actions within their official duties that are associated with the judicial phase of a criminal case. It concluded that Harris’s claims against Greenwell concerned conduct within that protected scope and dismissed them on immunity and related frivolousness grounds. - Mearidith T. Christopher: Harris named Christopher but did not identify this defendant or explain how Christopher was involved in the alleged constitutional violations. The court granted leave to amend to provide those details. - Police Officers Denully, Jordan, and Hernandez: Harris did not describe what Denully or Hernandez did or failed to do. Although he alleged that Jordan used excessive force, he provided no additional facts about that incident. He also did not identify the alleged perpetrator of the sexual assault. The court granted leave to amend these claims with more detail.

The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims that Harris might be asserting because it had dismissed the federal claims over which it had original jurisdiction.

Disposition

The court dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii). It granted Harris 60 days to replead his Section 1983 claims in an amended complaint, including his excessive-force claim. The order required him to submit the amended complaint to the court’s Pro Se Intake Unit, label it “Amended Complaint,” and include docket number 23-CV-4601 (LTS). If he failed to amend within the required period without showing good cause, the court stated that it would enter judgment dismissing the action and decline supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims. Judge Laura Taylor Swain also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-free status for purposes of an appeal.