Radio Music License Committee v. American Society of Composers

Background

Radio Music License Committee, Inc. (RMLC) filed a petition seeking a determination of reasonable final license fees under consent decrees involving American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI). The court initially stayed the case under 28 U.S.C. § 137(b)(2), which requires a rate proceeding to remain stayed while a court resolves an application to interpret the applicable consent decree.

Judge Louis L. Stanton later determined that the portions of RMLC’s petition involving ASCAP should be severed and assigned to another judge. RMLC told Judge Cronan that it had appealed Judge Stanton’s decision and argued that the statutory stay had to remain in place until that appeal was resolved. BMI argued that Judge Stanton’s decision was the final determination that ended the mandatory stay.

Issue

The issue was whether the phrase “the final determination of the construction application” in Section 137(b)(2) includes an appeal from a district judge’s decision interpreting a consent decree. The court also considered whether to issue a separate discretionary stay.

Court’s reasoning

Judge Cronan read the statute as referring to an application before a district court or district judge. He concluded that the final determination is the decision of the district judge handling the consent-decree interpretation, rather than a later appellate decision. The court reasoned that decisions interpreting a consent decree generally are not immediately appealable when they do not end the underlying fee proceeding. Requiring the stay to continue until an appeal could occur would create an indefinite stay because the fee proceeding could not proceed until after the appellate review.

The court also rejected RMLC’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision concerning an automatic stay during an appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration. Judge Cronan explained that the arbitration statute expressly provides for an interlocutory appeal, while Section 137 does not expressly create an immediate right to appeal a consent-decree construction decision. The court further noted that the dispute here concerned whether the fee matter would proceed in one proceeding or whether ASCAP would be severed, and that severance generally is not immediately appealable.

Disposition

The court determined that the mandatory stay under Section 137(b)(2) was no longer in effect because Judge Stanton had issued the final determination of the construction application. It found that RMLC had not shown a basis for a discretionary stay, declared that the case was unstayed, scheduled a conference to discuss the next steps, and directed the clerk to close the motion at Docket Number 36.