Stuyvesant v. Melissa Ann Crane J.S.C

Background

Curtis Van Stuyvesant filed a 262-page complaint against 29 defendants. He represented himself and had been granted permission to proceed without paying the filing fee in advance. The defendants included New York state court judges and employees, federal and state court officials, current and former prosecutors, private attorneys, unidentified New York City police officers, New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene employees, the City of New York, and other government officials.

The complaint sought damages, declarations, injunctions, and criminal investigations or prosecutions. It referred to claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986; the Rehabilitation Act; the Americans with Disabilities Act; the Religious Freedom Restoration Act; a damages remedy against federal officials; the Federal Tort Claims Act; federal criminal statutes; the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; and state law. The court viewed the complaint as focusing largely on Van Stuyvesant’s state conviction, unsuccessful appeals and post-conviction litigation, unsuccessful federal collateral relief, and a March 24, 2023 incident in which police officers and mental-health employees allegedly threatened him with involuntary psychiatric hospitalization after he sent written communications accusing defendants of misconduct.

Because Van Stuyvesant was proceeding without prepaying fees, the court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). That statute requires dismissal of claims that are frivolous, fail to state a legally sufficient claim, or seek money from a defendant protected by immunity. The court also considered whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction.

Rulings

Claims brought for Trevor Whittingham

The court dismissed without prejudice any claims Van Stuyvesant attempted to bring on behalf of Trevor Whittingham. The court explained that a person who is not admitted to practice law cannot represent another person in federal court. Van Stuyvesant did not allege that he was admitted to practice in the relevant courts or admitted to this court for the particular case.

Requests for criminal prosecution

The court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction claims seeking the criminal investigation or prosecution of defendants. It held that decisions to prosecute belong to prosecutors and that a private person cannot require prosecutors or the court to bring criminal charges against others.

Challenge to the state conviction

The court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction Van Stuyvesant’s requests for declarations that effectively challenged his state conviction, direct appeal, and state post-conviction proceedings. It applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents a federal district court from acting as an appeals court reviewing final state-court judgments.

Prosecutorial and judicial immunity

The court dismissed under prosecutorial immunity Van Stuyvesant’s damages claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Cyrus Vance, Jr., Alvin Bragg, and Hillary Hassler to the extent those claims arose from decisions to prosecute him, the prosecution itself, the direct appeal, or opposition to state post-conviction motions. The court held that those activities were performed as part of the prosecutors’ official duties and were closely connected to the judicial phase of the criminal process.

The court also dismissed as frivolous any personal-capacity claims against Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe under the damages remedy against federal officials to the extent those claims concerned actions assisting judicial work in Van Stuyvesant’s federal appellate litigation. The court held that judicial immunity protected those actions.

Federal Tort Claims Act claims

The court dismissed the Federal Tort Claims Act claims against O’Hagan Wolfe in her official capacity because the proper defendant for such a claim is the United States, not an individual federal employee. The court construed the claims as claims against the United States but dismissed them for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because Van Stuyvesant did not allege that he had first filed an administrative claim for damages and received a final written decision, or that six months had passed without such a decision.

Claims against the City of New York

The court dismissed the claims against the City of New York for failure to state a claim. A municipality is not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 merely because one of its employees allegedly acted wrongfully; the plaintiff must identify a city policy, custom, or practice that caused the constitutional violation. The court found Van Stuyvesant’s allegations about city policies and practices conclusory and found that he did not allege facts showing that a city policy, custom, or practice caused a violation of his rights.

The court assumed for purposes of the order that Van Stuyvesant’s written communications were protected speech and that the alleged threats of hospitalization chilled his speech. It nevertheless found that he did not allege facts showing that a City policy, custom, or practice was motivated by, or substantially caused by, his protected activity. Because he represented himself, the court granted him leave to replead these claims.

Claims against individual defendants

The court dismissed claims under Sections 1983, 1985, and 1986 and the damages remedy against federal officials against the individual defendants for failure to state a claim. Van Stuyvesant alleged the defendants’ personal involvement only in conclusory terms and did not provide facts showing how each person was directly and personally involved in the alleged conspiracy or constitutional violations. The court granted leave to replead these claims with specific facts showing each named defendant’s personal and direct involvement.

The court separately dismissed the conspiracy claims under Sections 1983, 1985, and the damages remedy against federal officials, as well as the associated Section 1986 claims, for failure to state a claim. It found the allegations of an agreement among defendants, retaliation, and causation vague, conclusory, and unsupported by factual detail. The court granted leave to replead these claims. It noted that a Section 1986 claim depends on a viable Section 1985 conspiracy claim.

Amendment and final disposition

The court dismissed the action but granted Van Stuyvesant 60 days to file an amended complaint asserting only the federal claims discussed in the order for which leave to replead was granted, along with associated state-law claims. The amended complaint could not exceed 20 pages and could not contain vulgar, profane, anti-Semitic, or misogynistic language. Claims dismissed without permission to amend could not be included in the amended complaint. If Van Stuyvesant failed to amend within the permitted period or failed to show cause for not doing so, the court stated that the Clerk would be directed to enter judgment dismissing the action and that the court would decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.

Judge Laura Taylor Swain also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to proceed without prepaying fees for purposes of an appeal.