McKenzie v. Big Apple Training Inc.
- Gregory Woods
- 1:22-cv-09554
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 21
McKenzie v. Big Apple Training, Judge Woods granted Big Apple’s motion to dismiss federal claims, allowing McKenzie 21 days to amend.
Kellyann A. McKenzie’s federal claims were dismissed or otherwise rejected at the pleading stage, while her state and local claims were left without supplemental jurisdiction; she was given 21 days to amend.
What happened
In McKenzie v. Big Apple Training Inc., Kellyann A. McKenzie alleged that the company ended her teaching work because of her national origin and religion, retaliated against her, copied her teaching ideas, and violated her privacy by recording classes. She also brought state and local discrimination claims.
The court found that McKenzie did not provide enough facts to support discrimination or retaliation under Title VII. It also found that her copyright claim failed because she did not allege a registered copyright, and that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to the private company she sued. The court declined to accept jurisdiction over her remaining state and local claims.
Judge Gregory H. Woods granted the company’s motion to dismiss and gave McKenzie 21 days to file a second amended complaint addressing the identified problems. If she does not amend within that period, the court said it will enter a final judgment of dismissal.
The detailed version
- McKenzie v. Big Apple Training Inc. · No. 1:22-cv-09554
- Gregory Woods
- July 31, 2023
Background
Kellyann A. McKenzie worked as an instructor for Big Apple Training Inc. She alleged that the company stopped offering her classes after students complained about her teaching. She claimed that the decision was motivated by discrimination based on her American national origin and Seventh Day Adventist religion. She also alleged retaliation, copyright infringement based on the alleged use of her teaching methods, and a privacy violation based on classroom recordings. Her complaint also asserted discrimination claims under New York State and New York City law.
Big Apple moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not allege enough facts to support a legally valid claim. Because McKenzie was proceeding without a lawyer, the court read her allegations liberally, but it still required her to meet the minimum pleading standard.
Court’s analysis
The court did not decide whether McKenzie had exhausted the administrative process for her Title VII religious-discrimination claim. Big Apple argued that she had not raised that claim in her administrative charge, but it did not provide the court with a copy of the charge. Without the charge, the court said it could not determine whether McKenzie had exhausted the claim or whether the claim was sufficiently related to the matters presented to the administrative agency.
The court held that McKenzie’s Title VII national-origin discrimination claim was inadequately pleaded. It assumed, without deciding, that she had alleged the other basic elements of such a claim, including an adverse employment action. But the court found no facts supporting even a minimal inference that Big Apple acted because of her national origin. The only asserted basis was McKenzie’s general belief that Jamaican people have a vendetta against Americans, which the court found insufficient.
The court also held that the religious-discrimination claim was inadequately pleaded. McKenzie relied on a request that she allow a student to take an exam so the student could pass, which she viewed as dishonest and inconsistent with her religious beliefs. The court found that this interaction did not suggest that Big Apple acted against her because of her religion, particularly because the director who hired her shared that religion.
The court held that the Title VII retaliation claim was inadequately pleaded as well. McKenzie’s refusal to allow the student to take the exam was not a complaint about discrimination based on a protected characteristic. The court identified her filing of the administrative complaint on April 6, 2022, as the only alleged protected activity, but she did not allege that any adverse employment action occurred after that date.
The court dismissed the copyright claim in its entirety. McKenzie alleged that Big Apple might have used teaching ideas, including having students come to the board, after recording her classes. But she admitted that she did not have a registered copyright. The court held that registration or preregistration was required before bringing the infringement action and that she had not adequately pleaded ownership of a valid copyright.
The court dismissed the claims purportedly based on the Fourteenth Amendment. McKenzie alleged that recording her classes violated a federal privacy right. The court did not decide the substantive basis of that privacy theory because the defendant was alleged to be a private company, not a government actor. The court explained that the Fourteenth Amendment generally restricts state action rather than purely private conduct.
After disposing of the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the authority to hear related state-law claims—involving the New York State Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights Law, and any other state or local claims the complaint might be read to assert. The court also noted that diversity jurisdiction was unavailable based on the allegations that McKenzie and Big Apple were both in New York.
Disposition
The court granted Big Apple’s motion to dismiss. It allowed McKenzie 21 days to file a second amended complaint to cure the deficiencies identified in the opinion. The court stated that if she did not file an amended complaint within that period, it would enter a final judgment of dismissal and direct the Clerk of Court to close the case.
Read the full 21-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.