Landsman v. Banks

Background

Jennie Landsman, proceeding on behalf of herself and her minor son, J.L., moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against the New York City Department of Education. She sought reimbursement for services provided to J.L. at the International Academy for the Brain (iBRAIN) during the 2022–2023 school year under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. She also asked the court to declare that iBRAIN was J.L.’s placement during the ongoing proceedings for the 2023–2024 school year and to require the Department to fund that placement and pay iBRAIN directly.

An independent hearing officer had awarded reimbursement for J.L.’s 2022–2023 placement and related services, subject to specified documentation. A state reviewing officer later affirmed some findings, reversed others, and ordered full transportation reimbursement under the terms of Landsman’s contract with Sisters Travel and Transportation Services, LLC. Landsman separately notified the Department of her intent to enroll J.L. at iBRAIN for 2023–2024 and said she had filed another administrative due-process claim.

Court’s analysis

The court applied the same standard to both requested forms of emergency relief. Landsman had to show a likelihood of success, likely irreparable harm, that the balance of hardships favored her, and that the public interest supported relief.

The court declined to order immediate enforcement of the reimbursement decision. Landsman had received the state reviewing officer’s decision only about two weeks earlier, and defense counsel said the Department was processing the payments. Landsman also conceded that she would not be harmed if payment arrived within the three weeks to one month that the Department described as common practice. Because the decision required reimbursement rather than immediate educational action, and because money damages could adequately address a payment delay, the court found no injury warranting emergency injunctive relief.

The court also rejected the request concerning J.L.’s placement under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s “stay-put” provision. That provision generally keeps a child in the current educational placement while covered administrative or court proceedings are pending. The court found Landsman’s submission deficient because she provided no documentation establishing that such a proceeding was pending, relying instead on statements in her motion papers and complaint.

The court further held that the request was premature even assuming an administrative proceeding was pending. Landsman had come to federal court only days after starting the process, before an independent hearing officer had heard the new claim, and without showing that J.L.’s enrollment at iBRAIN was at risk. The court relied on the Second Circuit’s concern that immediate federal intervention could bypass the administrative process. It also declined to direct payment to iBRAIN because Landsman had not shown that delayed or unpaid funding jeopardized J.L.’s placement; she had conceded that his placement was not in danger.

Disposition

Judge Paul A. Crotty denied the motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction without prejudice to renewal. The opinion did not decide the underlying entitlement to the requested reimbursement, placement, or funding on the merits.