Evans v. The City of New York
- Vyskocil
- 1:21-cv-08659
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 2
In Evans v. City of New York, Judge Vyskocil denied Evans’s motion for default judgment against BRC Lex Safe Haven because it failed to meet procedural and legal requirements.
Jeniere K. Evans and BRC Lex Safe Haven; the motion sought default judgment against BRC, the only defendant remaining in the case.
What happened
Jeniere K. Evans v. The City of New York and BRC Lex Safe Haven involved Evans’s motion for default judgment against BRC Lex Safe Haven, the only defendant remaining in the case. Evans was representing himself.
The court found that the motion did not follow the court’s individual rules. It lacked several required documents and explanations, including a proposed judgment, service affidavits, the Clerk’s certificate of default, and bases for federal subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. The court also could not determine that default judgment was appropriate because the motion addressed only state-law claims and did not explain the federal claims that could support federal jurisdiction. The court further noted that Evans could not bring a false-arrest claim where probable cause existed for the arrest.
Judge Mary Kay Vyskocil denied the motion for default judgment and directed the Clerk of Court to mail Evans a copy of the order and terminate the specified docket entry.
The detailed version
- Evans v. The City of New York · No. 1:21-cv-08659
- Vyskocil
- Aug. 8, 2023
Background
Jeniere K. Evans, representing himself, moved for default judgment against BRC Lex Safe Haven. BRC was the only defendant remaining in the case. A default judgment is a judgment entered against a party that has failed to defend, but the court must still determine whether the procedural and legal requirements for that judgment are met.
Reasons for the ruling
The court denied the motion because it did not comply with Individual Rule of Practice 4.G. The motion did not include a proposed judgment, a proposed order to show cause, copies of the affidavits showing service of the summons and complaint, or the Clerk’s Certificate of Default. It also did not provide the required descriptions of the legal and factual bases for subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, or a statement that the defendant was not an infant or incompetent.
The court noted that Evans had received the court’s individual rules and had repeatedly been warned that noncompliance could result in denial of a motion. The court also stated that self-represented parties generally must learn and follow procedural rules.
The court gave additional reasons why it could not conclude that default judgment was appropriate. Evans’s motion discussed only state-law claims for defamation, harassment, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Federal courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims only when they have original jurisdiction over other federal-law claims. Because the motion did not discuss Evans’s federal-law claims, the court could not determine that the allegations established BRC’s legal liability. The court also relied on its March 20, 2023 opinion and order in stating that Evans could not assert a false-arrest claim because probable cause existed for his arrest.
Disposition
Judge Mary Kay Vyskocil denied Evans’s motion for default judgment. The order did not state that the motion was denied with or without prejudice. The Clerk of Court was directed to mail Evans a copy of the order and terminate the specified docket entry.
Read the full 2-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.