Crowder v. United States
- Colleen McMahon
- 1:16-cv-04403-CM
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 7
In Crowder v. United States, Judge McMahon vacated Crowder’s firearm conviction because attempted Hobbs Act robbery was not a qualifying violent crime.
Andra Lamont Crowder’s federal firearm conviction and sentence on Count Three were vacated. The amended judgment addresses his remaining attempted Hobbs Act robbery conviction on Count Two.
What happened
In Crowder v. United States, Andra Lamont Crowder had pleaded guilty to attempted Hobbs Act robbery and to using and brandishing a firearm during that offense. The firearm conviction carried a consecutive 84-month sentence, followed by supervised release.
The Supreme Court later held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a violent crime under the federal firearm statute. The court concluded that this rule applies to older cases reviewed after conviction and that Crowder’s firearm conviction rested only on attempted Hobbs Act robbery.
Judge Colleen McMahon vacated the firearm conviction and ordered an amended judgment. Because Crowder had completed his imprisonment and supervised release, the court did not conduct a new sentencing hearing; the amended judgment covers the remaining robbery conviction.
The detailed version
- Crowder v. United States · No. 1:16-cv-04403-CM
- Colleen McMahon
- Aug. 9, 2023
Background
Andra Lamont Crowder pleaded guilty to two charges: attempted Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and using and brandishing a firearm during that offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and 2. The court sentenced him to 77 months of imprisonment on the robbery count, followed by a consecutive 84 months on the firearm count. The sentence also included concurrent terms of supervised release.
Crowder filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal procedure that allows a prisoner to challenge a federal conviction or sentence after judgment. The district court initially denied the motion. The Second Circuit later vacated that denial and sent the case back for the district court to decide whether to vacate the firearm conviction, including whether the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Taylor applied to older cases reviewed after conviction.
Legal Standard and Analysis
Taylor held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). The court explained that Crowder had pleaded guilty only to attempted Hobbs Act robbery and the related firearm offense, so there was no alternative predicate offense in the pleaded charges that could support the firearm conviction.
The court concluded that Taylor announced a new substantive rule. A substantive rule changes the range of conduct or the class of people that the law may punish. Such rules generally apply retroactively, meaning they can apply in collateral challenges to convictions that became final before the new rule was announced. The court relied in part on decisions holding that similar rules concerning unconstitutional statutory language applied retroactively.
Disposition
The court held that Taylor applies retroactively to Crowder’s challenge. Because the only predicate for Crowder’s firearm conviction no longer qualified as a crime of violence, the court vacated the conviction and sentence on Count Three.
The court determined that a new sentencing hearing was unnecessary because Crowder had completed his imprisonment and supervised release. It ordered an amended judgment reflecting, for Count Two, a sentence of time served, three years of supervised release, $26,840 in restitution, and a $100 mandatory special assessment.
Read the full 7-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.