Aronow v. Republic of Sudan

Background

This opinion concerns claims in multidistrict litigation arising from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The plaintiffs alleged that Sudanese government officials, employees, and agents knowingly provided extensive support to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, including financial services, travel documents, training support, protection, transportation, and other resources. They sought relief under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), international law, and state law.

Sudan moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which concerns subject-matter jurisdiction; Rule 12(b)(2), which concerns personal jurisdiction; and Rule 12(b)(6), which concerns whether the complaint states a legally sufficient claim. Magistrate Judge Sarah Netburn recommended dismissing some claims but otherwise denying the motion. After both sides objected, Judge Daniels reviewed the challenged portions of the recommendation independently.

Jurisdiction

The court adopted the recommendation that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims under several FSIA terrorism exceptions, including Sections 1605(a)(7), 1605A, and 1605B. The court found that the plaintiffs adequately alleged proximate causation—that Sudan’s alleged support was a substantial factor in al Qaeda’s ability to conduct the attacks and that harm from an attack on the United States was reasonably foreseeable.

The court rejected reliance on the FSIA’s noncommercial-tort exception because the plaintiffs did not allege that the entire tort occurred in the United States. It nevertheless found that the terrorism exceptions waived Sudan’s sovereign immunity for the claims at issue. The court also found personal jurisdiction over Sudan because the applicable FSIA exception and service of process requirements were satisfied, and Sudan conceded that it had been properly served.

The court held that family members’ claims and the insurance companies’ claims could proceed under the relevant FSIA provisions. It also concluded that state-law claims were not preempted by the FSIA terrorism exceptions.

Claims Allowed to Proceed

The court held that the plaintiffs adequately pleaded claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c) and (d), including claims involving personal injury, death, and reasonably foreseeable property loss. It also held that the plaintiffs adequately pleaded primary-liability claims under the ATA. Those claims were based on allegations that Sudan directly provided material support to al Qaeda, knowingly supported terrorist activity, and proximately caused the plaintiffs’ injuries. The court stated that the ATA claims of Federal Insurance Company and Continental Casualty Company also survived under applicable subrogation principles.

The court held that the plaintiffs adequately pleaded civil RICO claims based on an alleged conscious agreement between Sudanese officials and al Qaeda to commit predicate acts in furtherance of a common purpose against United States targets.

Under the state-law claims, the court held that the plaintiffs adequately pleaded trespass claims. It also held that the Ashton and Burnett plaintiffs adequately pleaded timely assault and battery claims. The court found that the alleged knowing support for al Qaeda could satisfy the intentional, concerted-action requirement for those claims.

Claims Dismissed

The court granted Sudan’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ secondary-liability claims under the ATA, including aiding-and-abetting and conspiracy claims. It held that JASTA’s relevant definition of “person” did not subject foreign sovereigns to secondary liability under the ATA.

The court granted Sudan’s motion to dismiss the ATS claims for failure to state a claim. It reasoned that the FSIA provides the exclusive route for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign in federal court and that the ATS does not provide an independent cause of action that could support these claims against Sudan.

The court granted Sudan’s motion to dismiss the international-law claims for failure to state a claim. It also dismissed state-law claims for punitive damages, conspiracy, aiding and abetting, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. The court dismissed assault and battery claims brought after September 11, 2002, on statute-of-limitations grounds. It concluded that the remaining assault and battery claims identified in the order, and all trespass claims, could proceed.

Prior Defaults

The court concluded that the amended complaints became the operative master complaints and therefore made prior entries of default against Sudan moot. Alternatively, the court found good cause to vacate the defaults because setting them aside would not prejudice the plaintiffs and Sudan had presented potentially meritorious defenses, even though Sudan’s earlier failure to appear was grossly negligent or possibly willful.

Disposition

Judge Daniels adopted Magistrate Judge Netburn’s report in part. He denied Sudan’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and found that the court had subject-matter and personal jurisdiction over Sudan. He granted the motion to dismiss as to the specified ATS, secondary-liability ATA, international-law, and state-law claims, while allowing the specified FSIA, primary ATA, RICO, trespass, assault, and battery claims to continue. The clerk was directed to vacate the certificates of default identified in the order and close Sudan’s motion to dismiss.