In Re: In the Matter of the Complaint of Verplanck Fire District

Background

Verplanck Fire District owns and seasonally operates the 25.5-foot firefighting vessel Marine I. The District is an all-volunteer fire district that provides fire protection, ambulance, and emergency medical services. Most of its calls were land-based. Troy Dyckman had served as a volunteer firefighter since 2013. He was not trained or authorized to operate Marine I, although he was permitted to respond to Hudson River calls.

On August 9, 2020, Dyckman was aboard Marine I while it responded to a report of a boat fire. Marine I was set to collide with a vessel from the Westchester County Police Department. Dyckman tried to prevent the collision by extending his leg between the vessels, injuring his leg. He applied for and received benefits under New York’s Volunteer Firefighters Benefit Law, which paid his related medical care and provided compensation benefits.

The District filed this action under the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, seeking exoneration from liability or limitation of its liability. Dyckman filed three claims: negligence and unseaworthiness under the Jones Act; unseaworthiness under Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki; and negligence under general maritime law. The District moved for summary judgment after discovery closed.

Summary-judgment standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court does not weigh evidence or decide disputed facts; it determines whether a trial is necessary.

Jones Act claim

The court held that Dyckman was not a “seaman” eligible to sue under the Jones Act. Seaman status requires an employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation that is substantial in both duration and nature. The court applied the Supreme Court’s guideline that a worker who spends less than approximately 30 percent of working time serving a vessel generally cannot qualify as a Jones Act seaman.

From 2018 through 2020, only eight of Dyckman’s 211 activities for the District were related to Marine I—about 3.8 percent. He also was not authorized to operate the vessel. The court rejected Dyckman’s argument that volunteer firefighters should receive a more flexible standard. It granted summary judgment to the District on the first claim.

Unseaworthiness claim under Sieracki

The court also granted summary judgment on Dyckman’s Sieracki unseaworthiness claim. The Sieracki doctrine can extend vessel-safety protections to certain people who are not Jones Act seamen but are independent contractors doing a seaman’s work and facing seaman’s hazards. The court concluded that Dyckman was not an independent contractor under New York law. Instead, New York law defined the relationship between a volunteer firefighter and the District as employer and employee.

The court separately concluded that the claim failed because the doctrine was not intended to cover land-based workers like Dyckman. It therefore granted summary judgment on the second claim.

General maritime negligence claim

The court held that New York’s Volunteer Firefighters Benefit Law barred Dyckman’s general maritime negligence claim. That law provides that its benefits are the exclusive remedy for a volunteer firefighter injured in the line of duty. The court determined that applying this state-law provision would not conflict with a uniform federal maritime rule. It also found that New York had a stronger interest in applying its benefits law than the federal interest in allowing this claim, given Dyckman’s overwhelmingly land-based work and limited connection to maritime activity.

The court therefore granted summary judgment on the third claim. It concluded that Dyckman’s receipt of benefits under the Volunteer Firefighters Benefit Law barred his general maritime negligence claim.

Disposition

The court granted the District’s motion for summary judgment. It dismissed Dyckman’s Claim with prejudice, granted the petition for exoneration from liability arising from the Claim, and held that the District was not liable for any losses arising from the August 9, 2020 incident. The court directed the Clerk to terminate the motion and close the case.