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S.D.N.Y.Substantive rulingFiled Aug. 17, 2023

Doe v. New York University

Judge
Vyskocil
Docket
1:20-cv-01343
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
16
Civil RightsSummary JudgmentCivil ProcedureContract
In one sentence

In Doe v. New York University, Judge Vyskocil granted NYU summary judgment on John Doe’s discrimination and promissory-estoppel claims.

Who this affects

John Doe’s Title IX, New York City Human Rights Law, and remaining promissory-estoppel claims were resolved against him; NYU obtained summary judgment, judgment in its favor, and closure of the case.

What happened

In John Doe v. New York University, John Doe claimed that NYU discriminated against him because of his gender when it expelled him for sexual misconduct and stalking after a female student’s complaint. He also claimed that an NYU-appointed advisor promised he would not be expelled, causing him to limit his defense.

The court concluded that Doe had not presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could find gender discrimination. It also ruled that, even assuming the advisor made the alleged promise, Doe’s reliance was unreasonable because NYU’s policy warned that expulsion was possible, an NYU official had told him the same thing, and the advisor had no authority to decide the sanction.

Judge Mary Kay Vyskocil granted NYU’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety, entered judgment for NYU, and directed the Clerk of Court to close the case.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Doe v. New York University · No. 1:20-cv-01343
Judge
Vyskocil
Date
Aug. 17, 2023

Background

John Doe sued New York University (NYU) after NYU expelled him and added a notation to his transcript following a disciplinary proceeding arising from a complaint by another student, referred to as Jane Roe. The university hearing decision found overwhelming evidence that Doe had engaged in an extended pattern of conduct that caused fear, emotional distress, and mental suffering, including sexual harassment, sexual exploitation, and stalking under NYU’s policy. The decision did not find sufficient evidence of sexual assault. A three-person panel later denied Doe’s appeal.

Doe’s amended complaint asserted four causes of action: two claims under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, one claim under the New York City Human Rights Law, and a common-law promissory-estoppel claim. The Title IX claims alleged selective enforcement and an erroneous outcome based on gender discrimination. The promissory-estoppel claim was based primarily on Respondent Facilitator Allen McFarlane’s alleged statement that Doe would not be expelled. Doe said he relied on that statement when deciding not to hire a lawyer and not to defend himself more vigorously. A separate promissory-estoppel theory based on a statement attributed to NYU official Mary Signor had already been dismissed at the pleadings stage and was not part of the remaining claims addressed here.

NYU moved for summary judgment on all remaining claims. Summary judgment is a decision entered without a trial when the moving party shows that no genuine dispute about an important fact requires a jury’s decision and that the law entitles the movant to judgment.

Title IX claims

The court analyzed Doe’s Title IX claims under a burden-shifting framework used in discrimination cases. Doe had to present evidence suggesting that gender discrimination influenced NYU’s actions. The court held that he did not do so for either theory.

For selective enforcement, Doe compared himself with Jane Roe, arguing that NYU investigated her allegations but did not investigate his allegations that she had abused him. The court held that they were not similarly situated in the relevant circumstances: Roe filed a formal complaint while they were students, while Doe repeatedly declined to file one during the investigation, hearing, and appeal. Doe filed his own formal complaint only seven months after his expulsion, when he was no longer a student. The court also rejected Doe’s reliance on a spreadsheet concerning sanctions imposed on other students, reasoning that he had not accounted for differences in the seriousness and facts of those cases. The court likewise found that a presentation containing statements about negative stereotypes did not show discriminatory intent by NYU or anyone involved in Doe’s proceedings.

For the erroneous-outcome claim, the court likewise found no evidence that gender bias caused NYU’s decision. Because Doe did not present evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer gender discrimination, the court granted NYU summary judgment on both Title IX claims.

New York City Human Rights Law claim

The court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the state and city claims because they arose from the same facts and evidence as the federal claims. Although the New York City Human Rights Law uses a more liberal discrimination standard, it still requires some evidence from which discriminatory intent can be inferred. The court held that Doe’s city-law claim was indistinguishable from his Title IX claims and failed for the same reason: he presented no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that NYU was motivated by discrimination.

Promissory-estoppel claim

Under New York law, promissory estoppel requires a clear and unambiguous promise, reasonable and foreseeable reliance, and an injury caused by that reliance. The court assumed, for purposes of its analysis, that McFarlane made a clear promise and that Doe suffered an injury. It nevertheless held that Doe’s reliance was not reasonable as a matter of law.

NYU’s written Misconduct Policy warned that violations could lead to discipline up to and including separation from NYU. Doe had reviewed the policy and knew expulsion was possible. Signor also told him that the allegations could result in expulsion, and later described expulsion as the worst-case scenario. McFarlane was Doe’s advisor, not the person responsible for deciding the facts or the sanction, and Doe understood his limited role. Because McFarlane’s alleged assurance conflicted with the policy and with information from Signor, the court held that Doe could not reasonably rely on a statement from someone who lacked authority to prevent the expulsion.

Disposition

The court granted NYU’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety, directed entry of judgment for NYU, terminated the pending motion, and directed that the case be closed.

The authoritative version

Read the full 16-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
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