Brook v. Ruotolo

Background

The two consolidated cases arose from allegations by the Estate of Judith Brook and Adam Brook, individually and as the Estate’s personal representative. They alleged that the defendants conspired to have Judith Brook declared incapacitated, take control of her assets and care, place her in a nursing home, deprive her of proper medical treatment, and cause her death. The complaints asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and numerous state-law theories. They also referred to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, but the court explained that Section 1988 does not create an independent cause of action.

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which addresses a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint adequately states a claim. Adam Brook separately moved to disqualify Ian Shainbrown and Joshua Rushing as attorneys.

Jurisdictional Rulings

The court addressed subject-matter jurisdiction first. The only federal cause of action in each case was a claim under Section 1983. Such a claim requires an alleged violation of a federal right by a state actor or by a private party acting under state authority.

The court held that no defendant was a state actor based solely on the defendant’s position or appointment. It concluded that the court-appointed attorneys, guardian, and court evaluator did not act under state authority merely because they were appointed by a state court. The court also held that the complaints did not adequately allege a conspiracy between private defendants and Justice Kelly O’Neill-Levy, the only genuine state actor identified in the complaints. In the court’s view, the allegations about the judge’s repeated appointments of Ruotolo and defendants’ alleged financial motives did not provide facts showing an agreement, including details about when or where such an agreement occurred.

Because the complaints did not establish a viable Section 1983 claim, the court held that it lacked federal-question jurisdiction. The court also held that it could not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims because supplemental jurisdiction requires an underlying basis for original federal jurisdiction.

The court separately ruled that diversity jurisdiction could not preserve the claims in Brook I. Adam Brook had alleged that the parties were citizens of different states, but he did not respond to the defendants’ arguments challenging diversity jurisdiction. The court therefore found that he had abandoned that argument. The court further noted that diversity jurisdiction was not asserted in Brook II, where the Estate was also a plaintiff.

Issues Not Decided

Because it found no subject-matter jurisdiction, the court did not decide the defendants’ arguments concerning the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, immunity, or failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). It also did not decide the underlying factual allegations or state-law claims. Adam Brook’s motion to disqualify counsel became moot.

Disposition

The court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss. It denied Adam Brook’s motion to disqualify Ian Shainbrown and Joshua Rushing as moot. The clerk was directed to terminate the listed motions and close both cases.