Boggs v. Citywide Mobile Response

Background

Jared Boggs sued Citywide Mobile Response, identified in the opinion as his employer, while representing himself. The court had previously allowed him to proceed without paying filing fees in advance. Using the court’s general complaint form, Boggs invoked federal-question jurisdiction and listed “Fair labor law, Libel, Harassment with intent to cause duress and emotional distress.”

Boggs alleged that Citywide told him over a recorded telephone line that he would be abandoning a patient in a physician’s care if he did not transport the patient. He also alleged that Citywide confronted him about a sensitive matter in front of coworkers, attempted to deny him a hearing with his union representative while deducting union dues, and fabricated a story to make him look bad or intimidate him from seeking legal advice or filing a lawsuit. He alleged emotional distress, aggravation, court costs, therapy, and occupational rehabilitation, and sought $120,000.

Legal standards and analysis

Because Boggs was proceeding without a lawyer and without paying filing fees, the court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The court explained that it must dismiss a complaint that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks money from an immune defendant. It must also dismiss a complaint when it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Although courts read self-represented complaints liberally, the complaint still must provide enough factual detail to make a claim plausible and must give a short and plain statement showing entitlement to relief.

The court construed Boggs’s allegation about a hearing with a union representative as potentially asserting a hybrid Section 301/duty of fair representation claim. This type of claim requires allegations that both the employer breached a collective bargaining agreement and the union breached its duty to fairly represent the employee. The court stated that Boggs’s allegations were insufficient because he provided few supporting facts, alleged no facts showing that Citywide or the union acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith, and did not allege that either Citywide or the union breached the collective bargaining agreement. The court granted leave to amend to provide available facts supporting such a claim against Citywide and/or the union.

The court also construed Boggs’s allegations as potentially asserting employment discrimination. It explained that such a claim requires facts plausibly showing an adverse employment action motivated by a protected characteristic, such as race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or disability, or retaliation for opposing unlawful discrimination. Boggs alleged no facts showing that he was mistreated or retaliated against for either reason. The court also noted that it was unclear whether he had filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which could affect whether any discrimination claim was timely.

Disposition

The court granted Boggs leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days. The amended complaint must replace, rather than supplement, the original complaint. It must provide a short and plain statement of the facts supporting each claim against each defendant, including relevant names and titles, what each defendant did or failed to do, approximate dates and locations, injuries, and requested relief. The court directed Boggs to submit the filing to the Pro Se Intake Unit, label it “Amended Complaint,” and include docket number 22-CV-10238 (LTS). No summons would issue at that time.

The court stated that if Boggs failed to comply within the allowed period and could not show good cause, the complaint would be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The court also certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-free status for purposes of an appeal. Judge Laura Taylor Swain signed the order.