Jones v. Atlantic Records

Background

Denise Jones, an independent artist who performs as “Necey X,” sued Atlantic Recording Corporation, Warner Music Group, 1501 Certified Entertainment, 300 Entertainment, and several individuals. She alleged that lyrics from her song “Grab Em by the P****” were copied into the songs “WAP” and “Thot Shit.” Jones also alleged that the defendants stalked, harassed, mocked, and mined her social-media content. She represented herself in the case.

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), Rule 12(b)(5), and Rule 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) permits dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. The court accepted well-pleaded factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion, while disregarding unsupported legal conclusions. Jones also asked the court to reconsider its earlier denial of permission to seek default judgment; the court denied that request for substantially the same reasons stated in its earlier order.

Copyright Claim

The court explained that a copyright-infringement claim requires ownership of a valid copyright and copying of original elements of the work. The defendants did not contest, for purposes of the motion, that Jones owned a valid copyright in “Grab Em by the P****.” The court therefore focused on copying and whether the works were legally similar.

First, the court held that Jones had not adequately alleged that the defendants had access to her song. Her alleged connection to an individual involved in a prior business dispute did not plausibly show that the individual knew her music or shared it with the defendants. Her assertion that the song had been published through BMI and ASCAP also did not establish that it was widely disseminated. The court considered additional assertions about the song’s availability on streaming services but noted that Jones had not alleged when the song became available in relation to the release of the defendants’ songs.

Second, the court held that the phrases Jones identified were not protectable as a matter of law. Short, commonplace phrases and general ideas or themes do not receive copyright protection. The court found that phrases involving “p** so wet” and “n**s wild’n” were common in popular culture and other hip-hop songs, and that works predating Jones’s song used similar language.

Third, the court held that the lyrics were not substantially similar. The court compared the wording, context, meaning, and use of the lyrics. It found that “got that na wild’n” and “why you in the club with ns wild’n” used different grammatical forms and appeared in different contexts. It also found that “p so wet, got that na wilding” and “wet *ss p****” did not share the same word pattern or repetition. The court concluded that an ordinary listener would not recognize the defendants’ lyrics as appropriated from Jones’s song.

The court also considered additional lyrics Jones included in her opposition to the motions. It found that she had not alleged registration of valid copyrights for those additional works and that the claimed similarities generally involved only one or two common words, short phrases, or similar ideas. The court held that those allegations did not state a copyright-infringement claim.

Other Claims

The court held that there is no private claim that a plaintiff can bring to enforce criminal copyright violations. It also treated Jones’s stalking and harassment allegations broadly as possible claims for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress under New York law.

The intentional-infliction claim failed because the allegations were conclusory and did not describe conduct sufficiently extreme and outrageous. The court stated that alleged copyright infringement, social-media monitoring, use of a similar business idea, naming “WAP” after “BAPS,” and copying a hairstyle and expression did not meet New York’s high threshold. The negligent-infliction claim failed because Jones did not identify a specific duty owed to her, negligent conduct, or a relationship creating such a duty.

Disposition

The court found that amendment would be futile because the central copyright defects concerned the works themselves: the phrases and concepts were not protectable, and the works were not substantially similar. It also found that amendment would not cure the defects in the emotional-distress claims. The court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss and dismissed the complaint with prejudice in its entirety. It directed the clerk to terminate pending motions, close the case, and mail Jones a copy of the opinion and order.