Hunter v. Debmar-Mercury LLC

Background

Kelvin Hunter brought an employment-discrimination action against Debmar-Mercury LLC, Ira Bernstein, Mort Marcus, and unidentified defendants. The opinion states that Hunter was the executive producer of The Wendy Williams Show from its beginning until his termination in April 2019. Debmar-Mercury produced the show, and Bernstein and Marcus were its co-presidents.

Hunter alleges that he received notice of Wendy Williams’s divorce filing on or about April 11, 2019. About one week later, Bernstein sent Hunter a written notice terminating his role as executive producer and ending his professional relationship with Debmar-Mercury. According to the allegations, the notice did not give a performance-related reason for the termination. Hunter contends that he was fired because of his impending divorce from Williams and that this violated the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL).

The case is based on diversity jurisdiction, meaning the federal court is hearing a state-law claim because the parties are citizens of different states and the jurisdictional requirements are met, as alleged in the opinion.

Motion to Dismiss

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not adequately state a legal claim. They argued that the NYCHRL’s protection against marital-status discrimination covers only discrimination based on whether a person is married or unmarried. In their view, it does not cover discrimination based on being married to, or divorcing, a particular person.

The court identified the motion’s sole issue as whether a claim based on an employee’s marital relationship with a particular person is legally cognizable under the NYCHRL. The defendants did not dispute that Hunter had stated a claim if the statute covered that type of marital-status discrimination.

Legal Analysis

The court followed Morse v. Fidessa Corp., a decision of New York’s First Department. Morse held that “marital status” under the NYCHRL may refer both to whether an individual is married and to whether two individuals are married to each other. Morse also concluded that amendments to the NYCHRL require courts to interpret the law broadly in favor of discrimination plaintiffs and that an earlier New York Court of Appeals decision, Levin v. Yeshiva University, could no longer control the interpretation at issue.

Because this federal case was based on diversity jurisdiction, the court had to apply New York law. The court explained that, when New York’s highest court has not resolved a legal question, a federal court generally follows an intermediate appellate court’s interpretation unless there is persuasive evidence that the highest court would decide differently.

The defendants argued that Morse should not be followed because of legislative history, the NYCHRL’s liberal-construction requirement, possible effects on anti-nepotism policies, and decisions involving the New York State Human Rights Law. The court rejected those arguments. It concluded that the defendants had not shown persuasive evidence that the New York Court of Appeals would reject Morse. The court also stated that the case did not involve an anti-nepotism policy and that generalized policy concerns did not justify disregarding a directly applicable First Department decision.

The court expressly noted that its decision did not mean it agreed with Morse’s interpretation. It stated that, in its view, Morse’s definition was not supported by the ordinary meaning of “marital status,” the NYCHRL’s legislative purpose, certain aspects of the Restoration Act, or the broader legislative history. But the court concluded that it was required to follow Morse because the defendants had not met the applicable standard for departing from an intermediate state appellate decision.

Ruling and Effect

The court held that, under Morse, Hunter’s allegation that he was terminated because he would no longer be married to Wendy Williams stated a claim for marital-status discrimination under the NYCHRL. The court therefore denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss and directed the Clerk of Court to terminate that motion.

The denial means Hunter’s claim was allowed to proceed past the pleading stage. The court did not decide whether the defendants actually discriminated against Hunter, whether the allegations will be proven, or whether Hunter will prevail. The court also scheduled a conference under Rule 16 concerning case management.