Mensah v. Boeing Corporation

Background

Seth A. Mensah, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Boeing Corporation in New York State court. Boeing removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Mensah alleged that, after a phone call with a Boeing representative in October 2020, he emailed Boeing an unsolicited proposal containing nearly 300 pages of formulas, equations, and diagrams. He claimed Boeing used his intellectual property in an electric engine component for the propulsion systems of two aircraft models without compensating him. He sought $20,000,000.

Boeing moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, Rule 12(b)(5) for insufficient service of process, and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

Personal jurisdiction

The court granted Boeing’s Rule 12(b)(2) motion. It found no general jurisdiction because Boeing was incorporated in Delaware and had its principal place of business in Virginia. The court also found no specific jurisdiction. Although New York’s long-arm statute can permit jurisdiction over an out-of-state company that conducts business in New York, the plaintiff’s claim must arise from that New York business. The court concluded that Mensah alleged no facts connecting his claim—that Boeing used his proposal on two aircraft—to Boeing transactions in New York.

Failure to state a claim

Alternatively, the court granted Boeing’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The court read the complaint as asserting trade secret misappropriation. Such a claim requires allegations that the plaintiff possessed a trade secret and that the defendant used it in violation of an agreement, confidential relationship, duty, or through improper means.

The court held that Mensah had not adequately alleged that the materials were trade secrets. He alleged that he emailed his intellectual property to Boeing as an “unsolicited” proposal, but he did not allege that he imposed restrictions on who could view the materials or otherwise took steps to preserve their secrecy. The court also noted that Mensah’s allegation about whether a contract existed was unclear and that, even if he meant to allege a contract, he provided no specific facts making a contract plausible.

Service of process

The court also granted Boeing’s Rule 12(b)(5) motion. The service affidavit stated that a process server delivered the summons to Bryanda Liliana Tobar at Boeing’s business address. According to the record, Tobar was a mail-room clerk employed by a Boeing contractor, not a Boeing employee. She therefore was not Boeing’s officer or authorized agent for receiving service.

The court also rejected service under the alternative method involving New York law. Although the service affidavit indicated that the summons and complaint were sent by mail, Mensah did not establish that Boeing returned the required signed acknowledgment of receipt.

Disposition

The court concluded that dismissal with prejudice was appropriate because repleading would be futile. It cited the lack of personal jurisdiction, Mensah’s failure to allege a viable trade-secret claim based on his unsolicited submission, and the court’s statement that Mensah had filed seven other lawsuits based on essentially the same or similar allegations, all of which had been dismissed.

The court granted Boeing’s motion to dismiss the complaint, with prejudice; directed the clerk to enter judgment for Boeing and close the case; and denied Mensah permission to appeal without paying court fees because the court certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.