Davis v. Banks
- Jesse Furman
- 1:22-cv-08184
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 14
In Davis v. Banks, Judge Furman required funding under K.T.’s final order, limited four students’ transportation reimbursement, and sent six disputes back for clarification.
The ten parent or guardian plaintiffs and their children, especially K.T., M.G., A.L., S.H., O.C., R.P., L.S., R.Z., S.C., and W.R.; and the New York City Department of Education and affiliated defendants.
What happened
In Davis v. Banks, ten parents or guardians sought funding from New York City’s Department of Education for their children’s private-school tuition and transportation under education-related administrative orders. The remaining disputes concerned whether K.T. could receive services after turning twenty-one and whether transportation reimbursement covered contracted costs or only transportation actually used.
The court held that the Department must follow K.T.’s unappealed August 23, 2022 order for the period it was in effect, even though K.T. had turned twenty-one. It also held that the parents or guardians of M.G., A.L., S.H., and O.C. could be reimbursed only for days their children actually used transportation services and provided adequate documentation. The court sent the disputes involving R.P., L.S., R.Z., S.C., W.R., and K.T. back for further proceedings to clarify the applicable orders.
Judge Jesse M. Furman issued the opinion and directed the Department to confer with the plaintiffs and file a proposed judgment by September 18, 2023. The Clerk was directed to terminate the plaintiffs’ summary-judgment motion.
The detailed version
- Davis v. Banks · No. 1:22-cv-08184
- Jesse Furman
- Sept. 11, 2023
Background
Ten parents or legal guardians of children with disabilities obtained administrative orders under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act requiring the New York City Department of Education (DOE) to pay some or all of their children’s private-school tuition and related costs. The plaintiffs enrolled the children at the International Institute for the Brain, commonly called iBRAIN, and entered contracts with Sisters Travel and Transportation Services, LLC, for transportation.
The plaintiffs asked the court to enforce transportation-related “pendency orders.” Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, the pendency, or “stay-put,” provision generally requires the school district to maintain the child’s current educational placement while the dispute is pending. The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, a procedure allowing judgment without a trial when the governing legal and factual record supports it.
By the time of the decision, two disputes remained. First, the parties disputed whether K.T., who turned twenty-one in December 2021, was entitled to pendency services for the 2022-23 school year. Second, they disputed whether the DOE had to reimburse the full transportation costs charged under the Sisters contracts or only the costs of transportation services actually provided. A separate dispute involving O.C.’s $1,130 claim for nursing services had been resolved.
K.T.’s Pendency Order
K.T.’s August 23, 2022 Pendency Order required the DOE to fund transportation between K.T.’s home and the private school, retroactive to July 6, 2022. The DOE did not appeal that order. The court therefore held that the order became final and that the DOE had to implement it. The DOE could not avoid compliance by arguing in this case that K.T. had aged out.
The court noted that the age question could be reviewed in a separate proceeding concerning a later administrative ruling that dismissed the parent’s claims for the 2022-23 school year. That separate proceeding would determine whether K.T. was entitled to relief after the August 23, 2022 Pendency Order ended, or whether that order was properly terminated. Regardless of that outcome, the court held that K.T. was entitled to the relief required by the August 23 order while it was in effect.
Transportation Reimbursement for Four Students
For M.G., A.L., S.H., and O.C., the relevant administrative orders stated that transportation services had to be “actually provided.” The court interpreted that language to mean that the DOE owed reimbursement only for days on which the children actually used the transportation services, with adequate documentation.
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ interpretation that “actually provided” could include a contracted-for ride that the student did not take. It also distinguished decisions involving different administrative-order language or different issues. Accordingly, the court held that the DOE was entitled to summary judgment on this issue as to M.G., A.L., S.H., and O.C., even though the DOE had not filed a separate cross-motion for summary judgment.
Remand for Six Students
The applicable orders for R.P., L.S., R.Z., S.C., W.R., and K.T. required transportation “to and from iBRAIN” or used equivalent language. The court concluded that both sides had plausible interpretations: the plaintiffs argued that the language covered all costs incurred under their transportation contracts, while the DOE argued that it covered only days when the student actually used the transportation.
Because the wording of the orders did not clearly resolve the dispute, and the cited case law did not supply an answer, the court remanded the matters for further proceedings and clarification. The court explained that the impartial hearing officers who issued the orders were best positioned to interpret them, and that further fact-finding might be necessary. K.T.’s remand covered only the period during which the August 23, 2022 Pendency Order was in effect.
Disposition
The court held that the DOE was obligated to implement K.T.’s August 23, 2022 Pendency Order during the period it was effective. It held that the DOE was obligated to reimburse the parents or guardians of M.G., A.L., S.H., and O.C. only for days their children actually used transportation services and for which adequate documentation was provided. It remanded the cases involving R.P., L.S., R.Z., S.C., W.R., and K.T. for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
The court directed the DOE to confer with the plaintiffs and file a proposed judgment by September 18, 2023, and directed the Clerk to terminate the plaintiffs’ summary-judgment motion. The opinion also expressed doubts about whether joining all plaintiffs in one case was proper, but did not rule on severance in this order.
Read the full 14-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.