Hector v. Johnson

Background

John Hector, an attorney representing himself, sued Kathleen Hector, Jeanine Hector, Edward Guthrie, Raymond Johnson, and Does 1 through 5. The case concerns Hector’s alleged co-ownership of two properties in Sullivan County, New York, and the removal and alleged damage of his personal belongings.

Hector alleged that he and Kathleen Hector had a partnership agreement concerning the management of a single-family residence on School Street in Narrowsburg. He alleged that Kathleen Hector conveyed an interest in that property to him by deed in 2013. He also alleged that he and Kathleen Hector jointly acquired five acres on Delaware Drive in 2012, although title to that property remained solely in Kathleen Hector’s name.

Hector claimed he made mortgage, insurance, and utility payments for the School Street property and performed maintenance work because he expected eventually to buy out Kathleen Hector’s interest. He alleged that the parties discussed different purchase prices but never finalized the transaction. He also alleged that, in May 2022, Jeanine Hector, Edward Guthrie, and Raymond Johnson, acting with and at Kathleen Hector’s direction, removed his belongings from the School Street property and moved them to a storage barn owned by Hector. He claimed that the items were damaged and that some, including a baseball-card collection, were missing.

Motion to dismiss standard

The defendants moved to dismiss the second amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court accepted well-pleaded factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion but did not accept legal conclusions or unsupported statements. Because Hector is a practicing attorney representing himself, the court did not give him the special assistance sometimes provided to self-represented litigants.

Claims dismissed

The court dismissed the breach-of-contract claim. It held that Hector had not plausibly alleged an enforceable agreement because the alleged oral agreement did not identify essential terms, such as the purchase price, payment terms, financing, closing date, or allocation of certain expenses. The court also held that Hector’s payments and maintenance work were not conduct clearly and exclusively connected to the alleged purchase agreement. Those actions could instead be explained by his alleged co-ownership, residence, or partnership arrangement. As a result, the court held that the alleged agreement was not saved by the exception for clear part performance to New York’s rule requiring certain real-estate agreements to be in writing.

The court dismissed the breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim because Hector did not plausibly allege that Kathleen Hector owed him a fiduciary duty. The court held that the alleged mother-and-son relationship, co-ownership, and partnership relationship, without more, did not establish the required relationship of trust, confidence, and superior influence. Because the accounting claim also required a fiduciary relationship and breach of fiduciary duty, the court dismissed that claim as well.

The court dismissed the fraudulent-inducement claim because Hector did not identify a specific fraudulent statement, the speaker, or where and when the statement was made. The court held that his allegations about Kathleen Hector’s general trustworthiness and intent to perform were not detailed enough to satisfy the heightened pleading requirement for fraud.

The court dismissed the partition claim concerning the Delaware Drive property. A partition claim allows an owner or co-owner of real property to seek division or sale of the property. The court held that Hector’s second amended complaint did not plausibly allege that he was a joint tenant or tenant in common because it acknowledged that Kathleen Hector alone held title. The court did not consider ownership statements Hector submitted in a declaration attached to his opposition brief because the court limited its review to the complaint.

The court dismissed the intentional-interference-with-contractual-rights-and-economic-advantage claim because Hector did not address the defendants’ arguments seeking dismissal of that claim. The court treated the claim as abandoned.

Claims allowed to proceed

The court denied dismissal of the conversion claim. Conversion means intentionally exercising unauthorized control over another person’s personal property in a way that interferes with the person’s rights. The court held that Hector plausibly identified specific property, alleged that he owned it before the alleged conversion, and alleged that defendants moved, damaged, or lost the property without authorization. The court held that it did not matter at this stage that the belongings were moved to a barn owned by Hector because the allegations included damage and missing items.

The court also denied dismissal of the trespass claim. Trespass involves intentionally entering another person’s land without permission or justification and interfering with the right to possess it. The court held that Hector plausibly alleged that defendants intentionally entered his barn without permission after moving his belongings there. The court also declined to dismiss Hector’s related request for property-damage compensation because that request depended on the conversion and trespass claims that remained pending.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss. All claims were dismissed except the conversion and trespass claims and the related property-damage claim. The court declined to grant Hector leave to file a third amended complaint, finding that another amendment would be futile and cause undue delay. Defendants were directed to answer the second amended complaint by September 28, 2023, and the court stated that it would schedule an initial conference by separate order.