Tew v. Town of Stony Point

Background

Jeffrey Charles Tew, proceeding without a lawyer, sued the Town of Stony Point and Stony Point Justice Court. He alleged that, on March 29, 2021, “Judge Philips” prevented him from accessing Stony Point Justice Court during a proceeding involving Robert Sullivan. Tew alleged that he had power of attorney for Sullivan and that, after Tew and Sullivan’s counsel returned to court, three police cars blocked their vehicle and officers told Tew that he could not enter the court. Tew also alleged that Judge Philips required him to wear a mask during the COVID-19 pandemic, although the judge did not wear one, and that the judge relied on the bar association to deny people the right to counsel.

Tew asserted claims for denial of access to the courts, false imprisonment or restraint of his freedom to travel, violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). He began the case in Rockland County Court, and the Town removed it to the Southern District of New York based on federal-question jurisdiction. The Town moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not allege enough facts to state a legally plausible claim. Tew did not file opposition papers by the scheduled deadline and did not respond to a later court order directing him to do so.

Removal and Remand

The court treated Tew’s later letter challenging the federal case as a motion to remand, meaning a request to return the case to state court. The court concluded that it had subject-matter jurisdiction because Tew’s claims arose under federal law, including claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and RICO. The court therefore treated Tew’s objections as challenges to the removal procedure rather than to federal jurisdiction.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), a challenge based on a procedural defect in removal must generally be filed within 30 days after the notice of removal. The court found Tew’s challenge untimely. It noted that Tew had participated in the federal case after removal, requested extensions concerning the anticipated dismissal motion, and waited until June 2023 to raise his removal concerns, even though the case had been removed in July 2022. The court also stated that any procedural mistakes by the Town were harmless in light of the federal questions in the complaint and the time that had passed.

The court denied Tew’s motion for remand and retained jurisdiction over the case.

Denial of Access to the Courts

For a constitutional denial-of-access claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege deliberate and malicious conduct by the defendant and an actual injury to the plaintiff’s ability to pursue a legal claim. The court found Tew’s allegations too sparse to support an inference that the defendants acted deliberately or maliciously. The complaint could be read as alleging that Tew was denied entry because vehicles blocked his car, because he was acting for Sullivan without being a licensed attorney, or because he did not wear a mask, but Tew did not allege malice under any of those theories.

The court also concluded that Tew had not alleged an actual injury to his own ability to access the courts. His allegations indicated that Sullivan—not Tew—was denied legal counsel or access. A power of attorney allows a person to act for another but, by itself, does not give that person ownership of the other person’s legal claim or standing to sue in his own name. The court therefore dismissed the access-to-the-courts claim.

RICO Claim

A civil RICO claim requires allegations of conduct involving an enterprise, a pattern of racketeering activity, and injury to business or property caused by the alleged RICO violation. The court found that Tew had not sufficiently alleged any of these required elements. At most, he alleged one act: that he was required to wear a mask to enter the justice court. He did not identify qualifying predicate acts or allege the other required components of a civil RICO claim. The court dismissed the RICO claim.

ADA Claim

The court explained that an ADA claim requires, among other things, a qualified individual with a disability, defendants covered by the ADA, and denial of services or discrimination because of the disability. Tew did not allege what disability he had or identify an impairment, record of impairment, or belief by the defendants that he had such an impairment. The court also found that his allegation that he was denied entry because he refused to wear a mask was conclusory and inconsistent with a claim that he was denied access because of a disability. The court dismissed the ADA claim.

False Imprisonment and Right to Travel

The court treated Tew’s references to false imprisonment, restraint of liberty, and restraint of travel as one false-imprisonment claim. A false-arrest or false-imprisonment claim under § 1983 involves the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable seizures and requires confinement that was intended, known to the plaintiff, nonconsensual, and not otherwise privileged.

The court found that Tew had not alleged that he was confined or that the police used force to restrain his movements. An order to leave a public place, without more, generally does not constitute a seizure when the person remains free to go elsewhere. Because Tew alleged no force or other sufficient restraint, the court dismissed the false-imprisonment claim.

The court separately considered a possible claim involving the constitutional right to travel within New York. It explained that this right is not unlimited and that claims generally involve a law or policy that deters travel, primarily aims to impede travel, or penalizes exercising the right. Tew alleged only a one-time incident involving police cars blocking his vehicle and identified no law or policy. The court therefore concluded that any right-to-travel claim also failed.

Disposition

Judge Kenneth M. Karas granted the Town’s motion to dismiss. The court dismissed Tew’s claims without prejudice because this was the first adjudication of the claims on their merits. The court allowed Tew 30 days from the date of the Opinion and Order to file an amended complaint containing all claims, defendants, and factual allegations he wished the court to consider. The court stated that failure to meet that deadline could result in the claims dismissed without prejudice being dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk was directed to terminate the pending motion and mail Tew a copy of the Opinion and Order.