Blitz v. BLDG Management Co., Inc.
- Ronnie Abrams
- 1:20-cv-05462
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 29
In Blitz v. BLDG, Judge Abrams granted the defendants’ summary-judgment motion, denied Blitz’s cross-motion, and dismissed the third-party claims as moot.
Richard Blitz’s ADA and FHA claims were rejected. BLDG Management Co., Inc., Amy Wolf, and Paul Howard obtained summary judgment; the court declined to hear any remaining state-law claims; and Wendi Newman’s third-party indemnification dispute was dismissed as moot.
What happened
In Blitz v. BLDG Management Co., Inc., Richard Blitz, who proceeded without a lawyer, claimed that loud barking from a neighbor’s dog harmed his health and that the building’s manager and employees discriminated against him because of his disabilities. He sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Fair Housing Act.
The court ruled that the defendants could not be sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act in these circumstances. It also ruled that the Fair Housing Act claims failed because BLDG offered Blitz other apartments and soundproofing, and the law did not require BLDG to subsidize his rent. The court declined to decide the defendants’ alternative arguments about the earlier housing case and time limits.
Judge Ronnie Abrams granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, denied Blitz’s cross-motion, declined to hear any remaining state-law claims, dismissed those claims, and dismissed the defendants’ indemnification claims against Wendi Newman as moot. The court directed the clerk to close the case.
The detailed version
- Blitz v. BLDG Management Co., Inc. · No. 1:20-cv-05462
- Ronnie Abrams
- Sept. 21, 2023
Background
Richard Blitz, a disabled tenant proceeding without a lawyer, sued BLDG Management Co., Inc., Amy Wolf, and Paul Howard. Blitz alleged that his neighbor’s dog, Mokie, barked loudly and repeatedly for years, causing him health problems, and that the defendants failed to address the disturbance or accommodate his disabilities. His complaint asserted claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The defendants brought third-party claims against Wendi Newman, Blitz’s neighbor and Mokie’s owner, seeking indemnification or contribution if the defendants were held liable.
The record showed numerous complaints from Blitz and other tenants about Mokie’s barking. BLDG served Newman with notices concerning the barking, began an eviction proceeding against her, and later entered a housing-court settlement requiring BLDG to make best efforts to persuade Newman to use a bark collar and other methods. During the federal case, BLDG paid to install soundproofing in Newman’s apartment and offered to install soundproofing in Blitz’s apartment. BLDG also offered Blitz several other apartments, including rent-stabilized units. Blitz rejected the offers, including one offer because BLDG would not reduce the rent to match the amount he paid for his current apartment.
The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment is a decision without a trial when the evidence shows that no reasonable jury could rule for the opposing party.
ADA claims
The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on Blitz’s ADA claims. It explained that the ADA provisions at issue cover employers, public entities, and public accommodations, but do not cover private individuals or a private residential apartment building in the circumstances presented. The court rejected Blitz’s argument that BLDG’s receipt of Senior Citizen Rent Increase Exemption Program tax benefits made it a covered public entity or public accommodation. The court stated that even federal subsidies would not transform the private residential building into an entity covered by the ADA.
FHA failure-to-accommodate claims
The court also granted summary judgment to the defendants on Blitz’s FHA claims. The FHA requires reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a home.
Blitz sought a transfer to a similar rent-stabilized apartment and, alternatively, soundproofing. The court assumed, without deciding, that the initial requirements for a failure-to-accommodate claim were met. It held that the claim nevertheless failed because BLDG offered the requested types of accommodations.
As to a transfer, BLDG offered Blitz multiple apartments, including a comparable rent-stabilized apartment in the same building and another rent-stabilized apartment elsewhere. The court held that the FHA did not require BLDG to further subsidize Blitz’s rent or provide a financial benefit beyond accommodating his disability. The court therefore concluded that BLDG had offered a reasonable accommodation even though the offered units cost more than Blitz’s current rent.
As to soundproofing, the court noted that it was unclear whether the FHA requires a landlord to undertake soundproofing or other new construction as a reasonable accommodation. The court did not resolve that question because BLDG had offered to soundproof Blitz’s apartment repeatedly, after installing soundproofing in Newman’s apartment. Blitz refused to provide access for the work. The court also rejected Blitz’s argument that BLDG had constructively denied the accommodation through unreasonable delay, finding no evidence of unreasonable delay, bad faith, or discriminatory intent.
FHA disparate-treatment and retaliation claims
The court granted summary judgment on Blitz’s FHA disparate-treatment claim. It found no evidence that Blitz was treated differently from other tenants near Newman’s apartment or that the defendants intentionally discriminated against him because of a disability. The court noted that BLDG offered Blitz the same soundproofing services offered to other affected residents.
The court also granted summary judgment on Blitz’s FHA retaliation claim. Blitz identified a July 2021 notice to cure concerning his conduct and a January 2021 letter offering other apartments as the alleged retaliatory actions. The court found that the notice to cure was supported by complaints about Blitz’s own conduct, including yelling, banging, excessive music, and harassment, and that Blitz had not shown a materially adverse effect. It further found that the apartment offer was made as an effort to accommodate his complaints, not as retaliation.
Other issues and disposition
The defendants argued that the FHA claims were barred by doctrines concerning Blitz’s earlier housing-court action and by the FHA’s two-year filing deadline. Because the court rejected the FHA claims on the merits, it did not decide those alternative arguments.
After resolving the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the authority to hear related state-law claims—over any remaining state-law claims. It dismissed the remainder of Blitz’s complaint in its entirety. Because the defendants were not liable to Blitz, their third-party indemnification claims against Newman, and Newman’s motion for summary judgment on those claims, were moot.
Judge Ronnie Abrams granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, denied Blitz’s cross-motion for summary judgment, dismissed the third-party complaint as moot, directed the clerk to terminate the pending motions, and closed the action.
Read the full 29-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.