Shim-Larkin v. City of New York

Background

Heena Shim-Larkin, who represented herself, sued the City of New York. She alleged discrimination based on national origin, race, color, age, protected status as a victim of domestic violence, and disabilities. Her claims arose under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. She alleged a hostile work environment, constructive discharge, failure to accommodate disabilities, and retaliation.

The district court referred the parties’ anticipated cross-motions for summary judgment to Magistrate Judge Jennifer Willis. Summary judgment is a ruling without a trial when the evidence does not show a genuine dispute over a fact that matters to the claims. Judge Willis recommended granting the City’s motion in part and denying Shim-Larkin’s motion.

Plaintiff’s objections

Shim-Larkin objected to the recommendations concerning her hostile-work-environment, constructive-discharge, and retaliation claims. The district court concluded that her objections generally repeated arguments already presented to Judge Willis. It therefore reviewed the challenged portions of the Report and Recommendation for clear error, meaning an obvious mistake in the magistrate judge’s analysis.

The court found no clear error in the conclusion that the comments and other conduct Shim-Larkin identified were too few and sporadic, and were not shown to be discrimination based on protected characteristics. The court also rejected her argument that the evidence established the required connection between the alleged conduct and discriminatory intent. Because the hostile-work-environment claim failed, the court also rejected the objection concerning constructive discharge, noting that constructive discharge requires a stronger showing. On retaliation, the court upheld the conclusion that Shim-Larkin had not shown an adverse employment action or a reasonable likelihood that the conduct would deter protected activity, and had not established the necessary connection between the conduct and her protected characteristics.

Defendant’s objections

The City objected to the recommendation that genuine disputes remained about whether Shim-Larkin had a qualifying disability, whether the City knew about an alleged qualifying disability, whether she requested an accommodation, and whether the City failed to participate in the required accommodation process.

The district court again found that the City’s objections repeated arguments previously made to Judge Willis and reviewed them for clear error. It concluded that Judge Willis had carefully examined the evidence and had not clearly erred in finding genuine disputes of material fact concerning Shim-Larkin’s failure-to-accommodate claim. The court also rejected the City’s argument regarding the state and city human-rights claims because the court stated that those laws use a broader standard for proving failure to accommodate than the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Disposition

The court overruled both parties’ objections and adopted the Report and Recommendation in its entirety. Thus, the City’s summary-judgment motion was granted in part, and Shim-Larkin’s summary-judgment motion was denied. The court directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the two motions and stated that it would issue a separate order setting the trial date and related pretrial deadlines.