Amy Miller v. Levi & Korsinsky, LLP

Background

Amy Miller sued Levi & Korsinsky, LLP, Eduard Korsinsky, and Joseph Levi. She alleged sex and familial-status discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law; caregiver discrimination under the New York City law; retaliation under federal and New York laws; violations of the federal Equal Pay Act and New York Equal Pay Law; and breach of contract against the law firm.

Miller joined the firm in 2016 as an attorney, received a base salary of $285,000, and was promoted to partner in December 2017. She later requested a fee-based bonus agreement. The opinion describes comments by Korsinsky and Levi about Miller’s husband, her work from home, her negotiating style, motherhood, and the conduct of another female partner. The defendants later terminated Miller’s employment. After Miller filed the lawsuit, the law firm asserted counterclaims accusing her of being a disloyal employee and interfering with its business relationships. The court dismissed those counterclaims in their entirety in February 2021, and the law firm did not try to amend them.

The defendants moved for summary judgment on all of Miller’s claims. Miller cross-moved for summary judgment on her retaliation claim based on the counterclaims. Summary judgment is a decision without a trial when the evidence shows that no important factual dispute requires a trial.

Equal-Pay Claims

The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Miller’s claims under the federal Equal Pay Act and the New York Equal Pay Law. Miller compared her compensation with that of Porritt and Enright, but the court found that their prior experience as partners at other law firms and their records of generating fees made them unsuitable comparators. The court also held that, even assuming Miller had established an initial case of unequal pay, the defendants had identified legitimate reasons for the difference: Porritt and Enright’s prior experience, professional credentials, fee-generating records, and the need to induce them to join the firm.

Discrimination Claims

The court denied summary judgment to the defendants on Miller’s discrimination claims under Title VII, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The court held that refusing to provide a fee-based bonus agreement could qualify as an adverse employment action, as could termination.

Although the court agreed that Porritt and Enright were not appropriate comparators for the equal-pay claims, it concluded that Title VII does not require Miller to prove an Equal Pay Act violation to prove sex-based compensation discrimination. Considering the timing and content of the comments about Miller’s husband, work from home, aggressiveness, softness, motherhood, and another female partner’s supposed need to “know her place,” along with evidence that the defendants sought reasons to fire her, the court found enough evidence for a reasonable jury to infer discriminatory intent. The court also found factual questions about whether the defendants’ stated reasons for terminating Miller were a cover for discrimination.

Retaliation Claims

The court divided the retaliation claims into two groups. For retaliation based on conduct before Miller filed the lawsuit, the court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Miller had asked to be paid like two male attorneys, but the court found no evidence that she told the defendants she was complaining about discrimination based on sex, family status, or caregiver status. The request therefore did not qualify as protected activity under the applicable retaliation laws.

For retaliation based on the defendants’ filing of counterclaims after Miller sued, the court denied the defendants’ motion and granted Miller’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Filing a discrimination lawsuit was protected activity, and the defendants knew about it because they answered the complaint and filed counterclaims. The court found that the undisputed evidence showed the defendants lacked a factual basis for the counterclaims when they filed them and relied instead on intuition and impressions. The timing of the counterclaims, their lack of factual support, and the defendants’ failure to pursue or amend them supported Miller’s showing of retaliatory motive. The court found that the defendants did not offer a legitimate, non-retaliatory explanation sufficient to rebut that showing.

Breach of Contract

The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Miller’s claim for payment for accrued but unused vacation days. The employee handbook stated that it did not create an employment contract and also stated that employees would not receive vacation pay instead of taking vacation time. The court held that the handbook created no obligation to pay Miller for unused vacation time.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part. It denied the motion on the discrimination claims under Title VII, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. It granted the motion on the Equal Pay Act, New York Equal Pay Law, and breach of contract claims. It granted the motion on retaliation claims based on conduct before Miller filed the lawsuit, denied it on retaliation claims based on the defendants’ counterclaims, and granted Miller’s cross-motion for summary judgment on those counterclaim-based retaliation claims. The court directed counsel to confer and report how they proposed to proceed.