Maroney v. Woodstream Corporation
- Kenneth Karas
- 7:19-cv-08294
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 30
In Maroney v. Woodstream, Judge Karas granted Woodstream’s dismissal motion in part and denied it in part, preserving most claims but dismissing others.
Gregory Maroney and Henry H. Heumann, along with the proposed nationwide class and New York subclass, were affected. Most of their claims could proceed, while Heumann’s warranty claims for purchases before October 2017 and the abandoned unjust-enrichment and injunctive-relief claims were dismissed.
What happened
Gregory Maroney and Henry H. Heumann claimed that Woodstream Corporation falsely advertised ultrasonic rodent repellers as effective. They brought claims involving deceptive advertising, fraud, warranties, unjust enrichment, and court-ordered relief, and sought to represent a nationwide class and a New York subclass.
The court found that the allegations plausibly supported claims that the repellers did not work as advertised and that Woodstream may have known about the problem. It allowed the remaining advertising, fraud, and warranty claims to continue, but dismissed Heumann’s warranty claims for purchases before October 2017 because the complaint lacked necessary timing details. It also dismissed the unjust-enrichment and court-ordered-relief claims because the plaintiffs did not address Woodstream’s arguments against them.
Judge Karas dismissed Heumann’s older warranty claims without prejudice and dismissed the abandoned claims with prejudice. He allowed the plaintiffs 30 days to file a third amended complaint addressing the identified deficiencies and denied Woodstream’s motion as to the remaining claims.
The detailed version
- Maroney v. Woodstream Corporation · No. 7:19-cv-08294
- Kenneth Karas
- Sept. 28, 2023
Background
Gregory Maroney and Henry H. Heumann sued Woodstream Corporation over Victor PestChaser ultrasonic rodent repellers. They alleged that Woodstream falsely and deceptively advertised the products as capable of reducing rodent activity within 6 to 10 days, providing maximum coverage, working anywhere indoors, and lasting three to five years. Their claims included violations of New York General Business Law §§ 349 and 350, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, unjust enrichment, breach of express warranty, and fraud. They also sought to represent a nationwide class and a New York subclass.
Woodstream moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states legally sufficient claims. The court took judicial notice of a 1994 Federal Trade Commission consent order as a public record, but did not consider a 1996 Federal Trade Commission letter because the court was not persuaded that it was a public record or that another basis supported considering it.
Court’s Analysis
The court held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the repellers failed to perform as advertised. Maroney alleged that he used the products for several months without seeing a reduction in rodent activity. Heumann alleged that, after using the products, he found property damaged by rodents. The court also found that scientific studies cited in the complaint plausibly supported the allegation that the ultrasonic method used by the products was ineffective, even though those studies did not test Woodstream’s specific products.
The fraud claim survived. The court concluded that the complaint plausibly alleged false or misleading representations, reliance, and injury, and that the scientific studies and Federal Trade Commission actions involving similar ultrasonic-device claims could support a strong inference that Woodstream knew or should have known that its representations were false.
The remaining warranty claims also survived at this stage. The court concluded that it could not determine on a motion to dismiss whether Maroney’s notice, sent about 11 months after purchase, was unreasonably late because the alleged defect—ineffectiveness in reducing rodent activity—could take time to discover. The court reached a similar conclusion regarding Heumann’s purchases made from October 2017 onward. But it dismissed Heumann’s warranty claims based on purchases before October 2017 because the plaintiffs did not identify when those products were purchased or when Heumann discovered, or should have discovered, the alleged breach.
The court dismissed the unjust-enrichment and injunctive-relief claims because the plaintiffs did not respond to Woodstream’s arguments seeking their dismissal. The court treated those claims as abandoned.
Disposition
The court stated that Woodstream’s motion was granted in part and denied in part. The motion was granted as to Heumann’s warranty claims predating October 2017 and the unjust-enrichment and injunctive-relief claims. It was denied as to the remaining warranty claims and the New York deceptive-advertising and fraud claims. Heumann’s older warranty claims were dismissed without prejudice because this was the first adjudication of those claims on the merits. The unjust-enrichment and injunctive-relief claims were dismissed with prejudice because they had been abandoned.
The court gave the plaintiffs 30 days to file a third amended complaint containing all claims, defendants, and factual allegations they wished the court to consider. It warned that the dismissed older warranty claims could later be dismissed with prejudice if the plaintiffs did not timely amend.
Read the full 30-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.