Kewazinga Corp. v. Google LLC

Background

Kewazinga Corporation asserted infringement of three patents: U.S. Patent No. 9,055,234 (the “’234 Patent”), U.S. Patent No. 6,522,325 (the “’325 Patent”), and U.S. Patent No. 6,535,226 (the “’226 Patent”). The patents concern telepresence methods and systems that allow users to navigate displays or imagery of an environment. Kewazinga alleged that Google LLC infringed the patents through Google Street View.

The patents expired on April 1, 2019. Street View uses a vehicle-mounted camera system called a rosette, which contains multiple cameras that capture overlapping images. Google processes those images into panoramas that users can view and navigate between. The parties disputed whether Street View’s system satisfied several patent requirements, including an “array of cameras” and “mosaicing.”

In an earlier claim-construction decision, the court defined an “array of cameras” as “a camera configuration wherein the configuration can be created over time by positioning cameras in relation to each other.” It defined “mosaicing” as “creating imagery assembled from a plurality of images, or portions thereof, including an alignment process and a composition process.” Kewazinga ultimately asserted specified claims from each of the three patents.

Google’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is a decision without a trial when there is no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. Google sought summary judgment on all asserted claims.

Array of cameras. Google argued that Street View did not use an “array of cameras” as the court had defined that term. The court denied Google’s motion on this issue. Kewazinga presented expert evidence that Street View’s rosettes captured images at regular intervals while traveling and that the cameras’ positions and angles in relation to one another could satisfy the definition. The court also concluded that the use of a moving vehicle did not by itself defeat Kewazinga’s theory. A reasonable jury could find that the multiple cameras in a rosette, moved over time, constituted an array of cameras.

The court also denied summary judgment on Claim 29 of the ’325 Patent. That claim concerns providing a user with views based on images captured from two different camera arrays. Kewazinga offered evidence that Google changed from one type of rosette to another during the relevant period and that users could navigate between panoramas captured at different times. The court held that a reasonable jury could find that the claim was satisfied.

Mosaicing. Google sought summary judgment on Claims 1 and 5 of the ’325 Patent and all asserted claims of the ’234 Patent because it argued that Street View did not perform mosaicing. Kewazinga relied on two theories: the transition animation between panoramas and the creation of the panoramas themselves.

The court held that the undisputed facts showed that Street View’s transition animations were not mosaicing because Kewazinga had not identified an alignment process used to create imagery from the selected portions of the panoramas. The court therefore granted Google summary judgment on Claims 1 and 5 of the ’325 Patent.

The court denied Google summary judgment on the asserted ’234 Patent claims. It rejected Google’s arguments that the panoramas could not qualify as mosaicing because they were not created in response to user input or did not combine imagery from multiple locations. The court found that the claims did not impose those requirements and that Kewazinga had sufficient evidence for a jury to consider whether creating the panoramas was mosaicing.

Kewazinga’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Kewazinga sought partial summary judgment on infringement of Claim 6 of the ’234 Patent and on several defenses and arguments raised by Google.

Claim 6 of the ’234 Patent. The court denied Kewazinga’s motion. Google presented expert testimony disputing whether Street View satisfied several elements of the claim, including whether Street View qualified as a processing element, whether its transition imagery was smooth, and whether the imagery was provided to the user interface device. Those disputes prevented summary judgment.

Written-description invalidity defense. Kewazinga sought summary judgment rejecting Google’s defense that the ’226 and ’325 Patents lacked an adequate written description of an array of cameras. The written-description requirement generally requires a patent specification to describe the invention in enough detail to show that the inventor possessed it. The court denied Kewazinga’s motion because Google presented expert testimony that a person skilled in the field would not understand the patents to describe a system using a moving camera. A jury could credit that testimony.

Anticipation defense. Kewazinga also sought summary judgment rejecting Google’s argument that the ’325 and ’234 Patents were invalid because they were anticipated by the Taylor System, a cinematographic process. Anticipation means that a single prior-art reference discloses all the limitations of a patent claim arranged in the claimed way. The court denied Kewazinga’s motion because Google presented expert testimony that the Taylor System’s description of morphing images encompassed mosaicing and tweening, and that a skilled person would understand the system to incorporate relevant third-party tools.

Failure to mark. The court granted Kewazinga’s motion concerning its obligation to mark products under 35 U.S.C. § 287. For the ’226 and ’325 Patents, the court held that Kewazinga’s filing of an earlier infringement lawsuit provided sufficient notice, even though that lawsuit was later dismissed for improper service. The parties did not dispute that Google knew about the earlier action. For the ’234 Patent, the court held that Kewazinga had no marking or notice obligation because the record did not show that Kewazinga made or sold a product covered by that patent after it issued.

Remaining requests. Kewazinga asked the court to prevent Google from asserting prior art not identified in its final election of asserted prior art and to rule that the patents did not disclaim cameras mounted on moving vehicles. The court denied summary judgment on these grounds because the first argument would not fully resolve a claim or defense and the second was effectively an argument against Google’s motion rather than a separate basis for judgment.

Disposition

The court stated that Google’s motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. It was granted as to Claims 1 and 5 of the ’325 Patent and denied as to all other claims. Kewazinga’s motion for summary judgment was granted on the failure-to-mark defense and denied as to all other claims and defenses. The court directed the Clerk of Court to close the two motions.