Liboy v. Russ

Background

Mark Liboy alleged that he has disabilities affecting his mobility and that he lived with his brother in a New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) apartment at the Baychester development. In 2016, he asked NYCHA for a disability-related transfer to a larger apartment in lower Manhattan or nearby Brooklyn, partly because his doctors were in lower Manhattan and his commute from the Bronx could take more than five hours. NYCHA approved a reasonable-accommodation transfer in 2017 and placed him on a waitlist for an apartment at Rutgers Houses.

In December 2018, Baychester was converted from public housing to project-based housing supported by the federal Section 8 program through the Rental Assistance Demonstration/Permanent Affordability Commitment Together program. NYCHA then informed Liboy that he would be removed from the transfer waitlist because of the conversion. Liboy later made additional accommodation requests. In 2022, NYCHA offered either a possible two-bedroom apartment within Baychester or a tenant-based voucher for a two-bedroom apartment, later increasing the proposed voucher amount and offering help with a broker and apartment search. Liboy alleged that these options did not adequately address his disabilities or allow him to live near his medical providers.

Liboy asserted claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Fair Housing Act, the Due Process Clause, the Housing Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which asks whether the complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally sufficient claim.

Statute of limitations

The court held that Liboy’s due-process and Housing Act claims, both brought under a federal civil-rights statute known as Section 1983, were untimely. The court concluded that those claims accrued when Liboy learned in December 2018 that NYCHA had removed him from the transfer waitlist. His later understanding that he might have been entitled to challenge the removal did not delay the limitations period. The court therefore granted the motion to dismiss the Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action.

The court also held that Liboy’s disability and housing accommodation claims were untimely to the extent they challenged the 2018 waitlist removal. It rejected Liboy’s argument that the removal and later denials formed one continuing violation. The court found that the 2018 removal was a completed, separate act and that Liboy was informed at the time both that he had been removed and that the housing conversion was the reason. The court therefore granted the motion to dismiss the accommodation claims insofar as they were based on the 2018 removal.

2022 accommodation claims

The court treated Liboy’s claims based on his 2022 accommodation requests as timely, but concluded that they still failed under Rule 12(b)(6). Applying similar standards under the disability and housing laws, the court explained that a reasonable accommodation must provide meaningful access to benefits or services that the program offers; it does not require a covered entity to create a fundamentally different program.

The court held that requiring NYCHA to provide Liboy with housing in lower Manhattan or nearby Brooklyn would go beyond the benefits provided by the Section 8 program. The court reasoned that Section 8 provides rent subsidies and related assistance but does not itself promise participants a particular place to live. It rejected Liboy’s argument that the distinction between tenant-based and project-based vouchers changed that conclusion, and it was not persuaded that the regulation concerning transfers applied only when a tenant voluntarily chose to move.

Because it dismissed the accommodation claims on that ground, the court did not reach the defendants’ additional arguments that Liboy’s requested accommodations were unrelated to the program’s benefits or that the accommodations NYCHA offered were legally sufficient.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). The order directed the clerk to close the case and terminate pending motions.