Donohue v. Banks

Background

Parents of eighteen students with disabilities sued David C. Banks, in his official capacity as Chancellor of the New York City Department of Education, the New York City Department of Education, and Brad Lander, in his official capacity as Comptroller of the City of New York. The parents sought immediate funding for tuition and related services connected with their children’s placement at the International Institute for the Brain, commonly called iBrain, during the 2022–2023 school year.

By the time of the ruling, disputes involving nine students remained. The parties agreed that the students were entitled to continued public funding for their iBrain placement under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s “pendency” or “stay-put” protection. They also agreed that the Department of Education was responsible for transportation costs related to those placements. Their dispute concerned the scope of that responsibility: the parents argued that the Department had to pay the transportation companies’ flat monthly contract amounts even when a student did not use transportation, while the defendants argued that payment was limited to transportation actually used or provided.

Legal standard and governing principle

The court explained that the IDEA requires public agencies to provide a free appropriate public education and treats transportation as a related service when needed for a student to benefit from special education. In this case, however, the statute did not resolve the precise scope of the Department’s transportation-funding obligation. The controlling source was the language of each student’s applicable administrative order, such as an interim pendency order or a final administrative decision.

The court reviewed the parties’ summary-judgment motions under the IDEA’s special review framework. In an IDEA case, summary judgment functions largely as review of an administrative decision. The court considers the administrative record and additional evidence, gives appropriate weight to the administrative proceedings, and may remand a matter when the administrative order needs clarification.

Orders requiring payment under the contract or for transportation costs generally

For R.N., M.B. for costs beginning July 18, 2022, and M.C., the court held that the administrative orders required broader reimbursement.

For R.N., the order required the Department to fund transportation to and from iBrain “in accordance with the contract entered into by the Parent.” Because the order did not mention in-person attendance, the court held that the Department had to reimburse transportation costs as provided in the transportation contract with Sisters Travel and Transportation Services, LLC.

For M.B. beginning July 18, 2022, the order required payment for transportation services “pursuant to the Transportation Contract.” The court rejected the Department’s argument that the order’s requirement for an itemization limited payment to rides actually used.

For M.C., the relevant orders required the Department to pay “any transportation costs,” including costs related to transporting M.C. to and from iBrain. The court did not need to resolve the parties’ disagreement about which of M.C.’s orders controlled because either order required reimbursement of the transportation-related costs at issue.

The court therefore granted the parents’ motion for summary judgment as to R.N., M.B. for costs beginning July 18, 2022, and M.C. It denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to those students. The parents were directed to provide paperwork showing the terms of the relevant transportation contracts so the Department could process the reimbursements.

Orders limiting payment to transportation actually provided or days attended

For M.B. during the period from July 6, 2022, to July 18, 2022, and for J.B. and S.J.D., the administrative orders required payment for transportation services “actually provided.” The court interpreted that language to mean transportation used on days the students traveled to or from school, not payment for days when they did not attend school.

For Z.C., the order required payment for the actual number of days Z.C. was transported. For D.O., the order provided funding for the dates of attendance and stated that funding included specialized transportation. The court likewise held that these orders limited reimbursement to days the students attended school or actually used the transportation services.

The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to M.B. for the earlier period, J.B., S.J.D., Z.C., and D.O. It denied the parents’ motion for summary judgment as to those students. The parents were directed to submit records showing the students’ actual attendance days so the Department could calculate and process the required reimbursements.

Orders requiring clarification

For A.D. and O.F., the court found that the relevant orders were unclear about whether transportation reimbursement covered the full transportation contract or only days attended. A.D.’s order required door-to-door transportation to and from A.D.’s home and iBrain. O.F.’s order required transportation to and from iBrain. The court concluded that these provisions did not clearly answer the parties’ dispute.

The court remanded A.D.’s matter to IHO Karen Charrington, who issued A.D.’s pendency order, for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. It remanded O.F.’s matter to IHO Mohammad Ezzati, who issued the relevant pendency order and later administrative decision. The court noted an unresolved dispute about whether O.F.’s later administrative decision had been appealed and whether it superseded the earlier pendency order. The court denied without prejudice both sides’ motions for summary judgment as to A.D. and O.F.

Other disposition and conclusion

Earlier in the case, the court had denied the parents’ motion for a preliminary injunction without prejudice at the parents’ request. In this opinion, the court directed the parties to submit a joint status letter within seven days stating whether any issues remained and whether judgment should be entered. It also directed the clerk to close the docket entries for the parties’ summary-judgment motions.