K.A. v. The City Of New York

Background

K.A. and D.S. sued the City of New York, New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, Physician Affiliate Group of New York, P.C., Warden Anastasia Blackmon, and Dr. “Jane” Vessell. They alleged that medical-care practices at the Rose M. Singer Center violated the First and Eighth Amendments. The defendants moved for summary judgment, a ruling entered when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The motion concerned the plaintiffs’ individual claims; class and municipal-liability discovery had been stayed.

The facility had a written policy requiring chaperones for intimate examinations involving the rectum, genitals, or breasts. The plaintiffs alleged that staff denied or delayed access to female doctors or chaperones, forcing them either to wait for care or undergo examinations without a female chaperone. K.A. said her Muslim beliefs prevented her from being examined alone by a man who was not her husband. D.S. described herself as spiritual but testified that her objection was based on the conduct being inappropriate rather than on a religious requirement.

Eighth Amendment claims

The court applied the two-part standard for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. A plaintiff must show both an objectively serious deprivation and that the defendant knew, or should have known, that the condition created an excessive risk to health or safety.

For K.A., the court granted summary judgment for the defendants under the objective part of the test. K.A. said a provider refused to call a chaperone and she left without treatment for cold symptoms, but she was seen by a female doctor less than an hour later. The court concluded that this delay did not cause the type of serious injury, lasting pain, or deterioration required for an Eighth Amendment claim.

For D.S., the court granted summary judgment on her claim that Roche touched her breasts inappropriately. The court noted inconsistencies between her account and the medical records, including a record showing a female doctor was present during the visit involving physical contact. The court also concluded that, even assuming the incidents occurred, the alleged touching was not sufficiently severe or repetitive and caused no lasting injury.

The court separately granted summary judgment on D.S.’s claim that she developed polyps or worsened fibroids because she did not receive gynecological care from a female doctor. The court found that D.S. had been offered gynecological care but declined to be examined by a male doctor. It also found no evidence that she reported bleeding and cramping to clinic staff, so the defendants could not have known about those symptoms or deliberately disregarded them. The order states that D.S.’s two Eighth Amendment claims were dismissed on the objective and subjective parts of the test, respectively.

First Amendment claims

The court denied summary judgment on both plaintiffs’ First Amendment free-exercise claims. It found genuine disputes about whether K.A.’s and D.S.’s religious beliefs were sincerely held and whether the defendants had substantially burdened those beliefs. The court stated that D.S. did not need to belong to a particular religious organization to invoke constitutional protection, and that credibility questions about sincerity must be resolved by a factfinder rather than at summary judgment.

The defendants also had to identify legitimate prison-related interests supporting the challenged conduct. The court concluded that the defendants had not adequately addressed that issue in their motion papers. The First Amendment claims therefore remained pending.

Claims against Blackmon and Vessell

Under Section 1983, a defendant generally must have been personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation. The plaintiffs argued that Warden Blackmon and Dr. Vessell were involved because they received complaints about providers violating the chaperone policy and did not act on them. Dr. Vessell testified that she received complaints from at least eight people, including K.A. and D.S., but did not speak with them.

The court concluded that the alleged failure to act on complaints about potentially unconstitutional conduct supported keeping the supervisory defendants in the case. It denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss Dr. Vessell and denied the motion with respect to Warden Blackmon because discovery concerning the claim had been stayed and Blackmon had not been deposed.

Municipal-liability claim and disposition

The plaintiffs alleged that the City had a policy of denying prisoners chaperones, causing them to decline medical attention. A municipal-liability claim under Section 1983 requires an official policy or custom that caused a constitutional violation. Because the court allowed the First Amendment claims to proceed, it found that the municipal-liability motion was premature. The court denied summary judgment on the municipal-liability claim.

The court granted the defendants’ summary-judgment motion on D.S.’s specified Eighth Amendment claims and granted summary judgment for the defendants on K.A.’s Eighth Amendment claim. It denied the motion concerning the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims and the municipal-liability claim. It also denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss Dr. Vessell and Warden Blackmon. The court did not analyze the plaintiffs’ additional Fifth Amendment argument because that claim had not been included in the first amended complaint.