Karupaiyan v. CVS Health Corporation

Background

Palani Karupaiyan renewed his request for pro bono counsel—meaning a volunteer lawyer—at an October 5, 2023 conference. The court had previously granted him permission to proceed without paying filing fees and had previously requested volunteer counsel for the limited purposes of holding a settlement conference and pursuing discovery. That earlier representation, provided through the New York Legal Assistance Group, later ended under the terms of the court’s order.

Karupaiyan sought new volunteer counsel for the upcoming trial and related settlement discussions. His complaint asserted race-discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. He alleged that Aetna, Inc., ActiveHealth Management, Inc., and Lakshmi Kalyani Bellamkonda discriminated against him based on race when they terminated his contract for work at Aetna-AHM. He also asserted common-law battery claims against Robert Denner and Purvi Jhala based on an alleged physical altercation connected to the termination of his contract.

Legal Standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), a court may request an attorney to represent a person who cannot afford counsel. In a civil case, the court is not required to provide a lawyer and cannot appoint one or pay one; it can only ask an attorney to volunteer. Requests are granted sparingly. The court must first consider indigence and whether the claims appear likely to have substance, then consider factors such as the person’s ability to investigate and present the case, whether conflicting evidence will require cross-examination, the complexity of the legal issues, and whether counsel would likely lead to a fairer result.

Court’s Analysis

The court found that Karupaiyan remained indigent. It also found that some of his claims were likely to be of substance. In earlier rulings on the defendants’ motion to dismiss and later motion for summary judgment, the court had considered extensive evidence, including Karupaiyan’s two-day deposition. The court had determined that disputed material facts prevented summary judgment on the discriminatory-termination claims and the battery claims.

The court emphasized that the case would require a factfinder to assess conflicting testimony. The testimony of Karupaiyan and Bellamkonda conflicted about whether an allegedly discriminatory remark was made. The testimony of Karupaiyan, Denner, and Jhala conflicted about whether the alleged altercation occurred. The court also considered Karupaiyan’s statement that apparent health issues would interfere with his ability to present the case. It concluded that volunteer representation could sharpen the issues and improve the fairness and efficiency of the proceedings.

Disposition

The court GRANTED Karupaiyan’s renewed Application for the Court to Request Counsel. The ruling did not itself appoint a lawyer or guarantee that a volunteer would accept the case. The court stated that the litigation would continue at a normal pace and that Karupaiyan should be prepared to proceed without a lawyer if no volunteer came forward.

The court separately certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from the order would not be taken in good faith and therefore DENIED in forma pauperis status for purposes of an appeal. The opinion does not state that the underlying discrimination or battery claims were finally resolved by this order.