Rosa v. Pathstone Corporation
- Kenneth Karas
- 7:23-cv-01071
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 9
Rosa v. Pathstone Corporation: Judge Karas denied Felicia Rosa’s emergency-injunction requests without prejudice because she did not show likely success.
Felicia Rosa’s requests for emergency relief were denied without prejudice; the order also addressed the defendants and the state-court eviction proceeding involving her.
What happened
In Rosa v. Pathstone Corporation, Felicia Rosa, representing herself, asked the court to stop an eviction proceeding and other alleged retaliation or discrimination, and to restore her Section 8 housing assistance.
The court considered Rosa’s equal-protection, due-process, Fair Housing Act, and Rehabilitation Act claims. It found that she had not shown a better-than-fifty-percent chance of winning those claims, and noted that federal law likely barred an injunction against the state-court eviction proceeding.
Judge Kenneth M. Karas denied Rosa’s temporary-restraining-order request and her later requests for injunctive relief without prejudice. The court also denied permission to appeal without paying court fees because it certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.
The detailed version
- Rosa v. Pathstone Corporation · No. 7:23-cv-01071
- Kenneth Karas
- Oct. 18, 2023
Background
Felicia Rosa, proceeding without a lawyer, filed a request for a temporary restraining order concerning an eviction proceeding against her in state court. After the court directed her to provide more information, she filed two additional motions for injunctive relief. The motions sought to prevent further retaliatory or discriminatory actions, restore her Section 8 housing assistance, prevent eviction proceedings, and obtain any other appropriate relief.
The court explained that a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction use the same standard. A person seeking that relief must show, among other things, a likelihood of success on the merits or serious questions deserving litigation, a likelihood of irreparable injury, a favorable balance of hardships, and that an injunction would not harm the public interest.
Court’s analysis
Rosa’s amended complaint asserted four claims: equal protection, due process, the Fair Housing Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
For equal protection, Rosa alleged that her Section 8 assistance was terminated because of her source of income, parental status, and race. The court found that her allegations might show adverse treatment, but her own evidence suggested that Pathstone Corporation and Megan Jackson based the termination on federal regulations governing Section 8 assistance. Rosa did not provide evidence that similarly situated people outside her classifications were treated more favorably despite violating those regulations.
For due process, Rosa alleged that she received inadequate treatment during the termination process, including procedural problems at a virtual hearing. The court found that she had not explained or shown why the notices and hearing she received were legally insufficient. She also did not provide evidence that she would have prevailed at a hearing without the alleged procedural problems.
For the Fair Housing Act and Rehabilitation Act claims, the court treated Rosa’s allegations as claims of intentional unequal treatment. It found that she had not shown a likelihood of success because she had not undermined the possibility that the termination was based on a valid, nondiscriminatory reason, such as an alleged failure to follow applicable federal regulations.
The court also stated that the Anti-Injunction Act, a federal law that generally limits federal courts from stopping state-court proceedings, would likely prevent it from enjoining the state eviction case. The court separately noted that the filings did not show that Rosa had notified the defendants about her requests for injunctive relief or shown why notice should not be required.
Disposition
Because Rosa had not demonstrated the required likelihood of success on the merits, Judge Kenneth M. Karas denied her temporary restraining order motion and her subsequent motions for injunctive relief without prejudice. The court clarified that this ruling did not necessarily mean Rosa could not ultimately succeed on her claims or that she had failed to state a legally valid claim; it ruled only that she had not shown a likelihood of success on the record presented for emergency relief.
The clerk was directed to terminate the pending motions and mail the order to Rosa. The court also certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to appeal without paying court fees.
Read the full 9-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.