Grullon v. Banks

Background

The plaintiffs are parents and natural guardians of seven minor children who, according to the complaint, have brain injuries affecting their educational abilities and performance. They enrolled the children at the International Academy for the Brain, or iBRAIN, and filed administrative due process complaints against the New York City Department of Education alleging that it failed to provide a free appropriate public education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.

The plaintiffs asked the court to declare iBRAIN the children’s “pendency placement” for the 2023–2024 school year under Section 1415(j) of the Act. That provision, commonly called the “stay-put” rule, generally requires a child to remain in the last agreed-upon educational placement during administrative and judicial proceedings, at public expense.

The defendants moved to dismiss and opposed the plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief. By the time of the ruling, the children’s circumstances fell into three groups: H.C., L.S., S.J.D., D.O., and R.P. had received confirmation from the Department of Education that iBRAIN was their pendency placement; C.B. was still awaiting a pendency determination; and R.N. had received a pendency order declining to recognize iBRAIN as the placement. R.N. remained at iBRAIN, and the parties indicated that the Department of Education would recognize iBRAIN as R.N.’s placement during an appeal of the adverse state review decision.

Legal standards

The court considered the defendants’ challenge under Rule 12(b)(1), which permits dismissal when a federal court lacks authority to hear a case. Federal courts may decide only live disputes. A case is moot when the plaintiff no longer has a legally recognizable interest in the requested relief. A claim is not ripe when it depends on future events that may never occur as expected.

The five claims that became moot

The court held that H.C.’s, L.S.’s, S.J.D.’s, D.O.’s, and R.P.’s claims were moot because each child had received the precise relief sought: confirmation that iBRAIN was the pendency placement. The court also noted that plaintiffs’ counsel had acknowledged that claims for children who received the requested relief were moot.

The court rejected an argument that the Department of Education’s failure to fund H.C.’s transportation services revived H.C.’s claim in this action. The court stated that any claim based on delayed transportation payments would have to be brought separately because H.C. had already received the relief sought here.

C.B.’s claim was not ripe

The court held that C.B.’s claim was not ripe for judicial review. The Department of Education had not disputed C.B.’s placement, C.B. remained at iBRAIN, and plaintiffs had not shown that C.B. was in danger of losing that placement. Whether the Department of Education would dispute the placement or otherwise violate the stay-put rule depended on future events that might not occur.

The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the stay-put rule itself automatically entitled them to a court order requiring the Department of Education to acknowledge a pendency placement. The court explained that the rule automatically protects a student’s ability to remain in the current placement; it does not require the Department of Education to immediately make a pendency determination when it has not changed the student’s placement or otherwise violated the rule. The court also found no specific statutory deadline requiring an immediate determination and noted that plaintiffs filed this action one day after filing their administrative complaints.

The opinion additionally noted a substantial question about whether C.B. had standing because plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged a violation of the stay-put rule. The court’s ruling on C.B.’s claim, however, was based on lack of ripeness.

R.N.’s claim remained justiciable

The court held that R.N.’s claim was ripe because R.N. had received two adverse pendency determinations and the Department of Education had not agreed that iBRAIN was R.N.’s placement. Those facts created a live dispute for the court to address. The court denied the Department of Education’s motion to dismiss as to R.N.’s claim.

Disposition

The court granted defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint as to Madeline Grullon, Maytinee Bird, Maria Hidalgo, Patrick Donohue, Adeyjumoke Ogunleye, and Rosa Elba de Paulino, each individually and as parent and natural guardian of the identified child. The court denied the motion as to Svetlana Khanimova, individually and as parent and natural guardian of R.N.

The application for emergency relief at ECF No. 6 remained pending for Khanimova. The Clerk of Court was directed to close the case only as to the six plaintiffs listed in the granting portion of the order and to terminate the motion at ECF No. 14.