Watts v. Brito

Background

Carlyn Watts, who was proceeding without a lawyer, filed a complaint invoking federal-question jurisdiction and seeking unspecified relief. The court understood the complaint as alleging housing discrimination involving Watts’s Section 8 housing program, a housing location, inspections and repairs, alleged harassment, and the termination of his Section 8 assistance. The complaint referred to events occurring on May 31, 2023, at what appeared to be an office of the New York City Department of Housing, Preservation, and Development.

Watts named Ingrid Brito, Joshua Walters, an unidentified New York City Housing Authority supervisor, and Letitia James, identified in the opinion as the Attorney General of the State of New York. The court had previously allowed Watts to proceed without prepaying filing fees. It liberally construed the complaint as asserting constitutional equal-protection claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, housing-discrimination claims under the Federal Housing Act, and claims under the New York State and New York City Human Rights Laws.

Screening standards

Because Watts was proceeding without prepaying fees, the court was required to dismiss any claim that was frivolous or malicious, failed to state a claim for relief, sought money from an immune defendant, or fell outside the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. The court also explained that a self-represented complaint is read liberally, but still must provide enough factual detail to make a claim plausible and must satisfy the requirement for a short and plain statement showing entitlement to relief.

Section 1983 claims

For a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both a violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right and action taken under state law. The court explained that the unidentified NYCHA supervisor and Letitia James were state actors for this purpose. It could not determine from the complaint whether Brito or Walters were state actors, and Watts did not allege facts showing that any defendant was personally and directly involved in the alleged constitutional violations.

The court also construed the constitutional housing-discrimination allegations as an equal-protection claim based on a “class-of-one” theory because Watts did not allege discrimination based on membership in a protected class. To state that type of claim, he had to allege intentional treatment different from that of similarly situated people without a rational basis. The court found that he had not provided those facts.

Federal Housing Act claims

The court explained that the Federal Housing Act prohibits certain housing discrimination based on characteristics including race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or disability. For an intentional-discrimination claim, Watts had to allege facts showing that he belonged to a protected class, suffered adverse treatment, and could plausibly connect that treatment to discriminatory motivation. He also had to allege that the discrimination resulted from an affirmative act by, or enforcement of a discriminatory rule or policy by, at least one individual defendant.

Because the complaint was difficult to understand, the court could not identify facts sufficient to state an intentional-discrimination claim under the Federal Housing Act. It therefore allowed Watts to amend and provide the necessary facts.

Leave to amend and disposition

The court granted Watts leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days. The amended complaint had to completely replace the original complaint rather than supplement it. Watts was directed to name each involved defendant in both the caption and the statement of claim, or to use “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” if a defendant’s name was unknown. He was also directed to state the relevant events, each defendant’s actions or failures to act, approximate dates and locations, his injuries, and the relief sought.

The court did not dismiss the action at this stage. It warned that if Watts failed to file a compliant amended complaint within the allotted time and could not show good cause, it would dismiss the federal claims for failure to state a claim and decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state and local claims. The court also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied Watts fee-free appeal status.