Nicholson v. The Bank of New York Mellon
- Paul Gardephe
- 1:22-cv-03177
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 7
In Nicholson v. The Bank of New York Mellon, Judge Gardephe denied Nicholson’s motion to vacate an earlier dismissal, finding no lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Harriet Nicholson’s attempt to set aside the August 28, 2023 dismissal order was denied; The Bank of New York Mellon’s dismissal remained in effect.
What happened
In Nicholson v. The Bank of New York Mellon, Harriet Nicholson asked the court to set aside its August 28, 2023 order under a rule allowing relief from a legally void order. She argued that the court lacked power to hear her case.
The earlier order granted the Bank’s motion to dismiss and closed the case. Nicholson argued that the court could not decide other issues after supposedly lacking jurisdiction under a legal doctrine concerning federal review of state-court judgments.
The court rejected that argument and denied Nicholson’s motion. Judge Paul Gardephe explained that the court had properly exercised jurisdiction and could consider the Bank’s argument that Nicholson’s claims were barred because they had already been resolved. The clerk was directed to terminate the motions.
The detailed version
- Nicholson v. The Bank of New York Mellon · No. 1:22-cv-03177
- Paul Gardephe
- Nov. 13, 2023
Background
Harriet Nicholson moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4), which permits a court to grant relief from a final order if the order is void. She sought relief from the court’s August 28, 2023 order, which granted The Bank of New York Mellon’s motion to dismiss and closed the case. The earlier order also denied Nicholson’s request to amend and denied as moot her motion for partial summary judgment and her request for a status conference.
Nicholson argued that the August order was void because the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction—the court’s legal authority to hear the type of dispute involved. Her argument relied on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a rule that can prevent a federal district court from reviewing injuries caused by state-court judgments. She contended that, without jurisdiction, the court could not reach the issue of whether her claims were barred by an earlier case.
Court’s Analysis
The court explained that its August 28 order had not held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applied. Instead, the court noted that the Second Circuit had held in a case involving a pending state-court appeal that the state proceedings had not ended and Rooker-Feldman therefore did not apply. The court also considered the timing of Nicholson’s federal filing, the Texas Court of Appeals’ order, and the later issuance of the state-court mandate. On that record, the court found no basis to conclude that Rooker-Feldman applied and no basis to question its subject-matter jurisdiction.
Because the court had jurisdiction, it concluded that it properly considered the Bank’s argument under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) that Nicholson’s claims were barred by res judicata, meaning that the claims had already been resolved in an earlier proceeding. The court rejected Nicholson’s contention that the August 28 order was void for lack of jurisdiction.
Disposition
The court denied Nicholson’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion for relief from the August 28 order. It directed the clerk to terminate the motions at Docket Nos. 110 and 111. The order was signed by Judge Paul G. Gardephe on November 10, 2023.
Read the full 7-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.