Jones v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz

Background

Loretta Jones proceeded without a lawyer and requested to proceed without paying court fees. She sued H&M Hennes & Mauritz and numerous other defendants, alleging employment discrimination and a decades-long conspiracy involving stalking, sexual assaults, chemical fumes, surveillance, and what she called “Remote Weaponry Invasions” and “Directed Energy Weapons.” She sought $250 in damages and an order banning the alleged remote weapons.

In an earlier order, the court dismissed the original complaint but allowed Jones to file an amended complaint only as to possible employment-discrimination claims against H&M under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court had previously dismissed the remote-weapon allegations as frivolous, dismissed claims against several government and other defendants on stated immunity or pleading grounds, and dismissed Jones’s Title VII claims as untimely while allowing her to try to allege facts supporting timeliness or equitable tolling.

Claims in the Amended Complaint

Jones’s amended complaint again named H&M and defendants whose claims had already been dismissed. It also added PMA Insurance Group PMA Companies, New York State Attorney General Letitia James, the New York City Law Department, a purported Department of Defense entity, Udolf Properties, Henry Street Settlement, and partially identified individuals. The court determined that these new claims went beyond the limited permission to amend.

Jones alleged that H&M discriminated against her based on race and gender during her employment in 2000 and 2001, including by assigning her work involving toxic spray, failing to compensate her for workplace injuries, and treating Black employees according to racial stereotypes. She also alleged that H&M and others engaged in later harassment and surveillance, and argued that these circumstances explained why she did not timely report the alleged employment discrimination.

Court’s Analysis

The court again dismissed Jones’s claims arising from the alleged “Remote Weaponry Invasions” and “Directed Energy Weapons” as frivolous, relying on its earlier order. It also again dismissed claims against the United States Supreme Court, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the International Criminal Court, the New York State Workers’ Compensation Board, the New York City Police Department, and the City of New York for the reasons stated in that earlier order.

The court dismissed without prejudice the claims against the newly added defendants because those claims exceeded the permitted scope of amendment. “Without prejudice” means those claims were not barred from being filed again solely by that dismissal, although the opinion did not decide what other barriers might apply.

For the Title VII claims, the court explained that a discrimination charge generally must be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act in New York. Jones alleged discrimination in 2000 and 2001, but did not allege that she filed a charge at any time. The court concluded that the claims were plainly time-barred from the face of the pleadings.

The court also rejected equitable tolling, a doctrine that can extend a filing deadline in rare circumstances. Even accepting Jones’s remaining allegations of harassment, the court found that she did not allege facts showing that she was unaware of the alleged racial discrimination when it occurred, was actually prevented from filing on time, or acted with reasonable diligence during the more than 20-year period. The court therefore dismissed the Title VII claims for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Disposition

The court dismissed the action. It declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the court’s authority to hear related state-law claims—because it had dismissed the federal claims. It denied further leave to amend, finding that another amendment could not cure the defects. The court also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-free appeal status. The clerk was directed to enter judgment.