Sullivan v. Gelb

Background

This order resolved Mark Sullivan’s two motions asking the court to take judicial notice of facts, his motion to stay the proceedings, and his two motions to “correct the record.” The defendants are Peter Gelb, Marcia Sells, Stephanie Basta, and Samuel Wheeler. The court noted that two motions to dismiss were pending and nearly fully briefed.

Judicial-notice motions

Sullivan asked the court to take judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201 of dictionary definitions of “discuss,” “negotiate,” “coerce,” and “coercion,” as well as distinctions among those terms. The court explained that judicial notice generally concerns facts that are not reasonably disputable, not dictionary definitions or documents themselves. Although courts may refer to dictionary definitions when deciding contract issues, the court concluded that it did not need to take judicial notice of any particular definition to decide the pending dismissal motions. It therefore denied Sullivan’s two judicial-notice motions, Dkt. Nos. 30 and 69, with prejudice.

Motion for a stay

Sullivan sought a stay while the court considered his first judicial-notice motion. He argued that the definitions could affect whether his agreement to discuss a possible policy also meant that he consented to negotiating a binding policy. The court denied the stay motion, Dkt. No. 72, without prejudice. It found that no stay was necessary because the judicial-notice motions had been denied, discovery was already stayed while the dismissal motions were pending, and contract-interpretation issues would be addressed when the court resolved those motions.

Motions to “correct the record”

For the first motion, Dkt. No. 75, Sullivan sought to replace exhibits concerning disability-insurance replacement costs and pension benefits with updated versions. He said newly obtained information changed the amounts stated in those exhibits. The court held that Rule 60(a), which permits correction of clerical mistakes or errors caused by oversight or omission in a judgment or record, did not apply to information that Sullivan later discovered was different from what he had originally reported. The court treated the request as a motion for leave to amend the complaint under Rule 15(a). Because dismissal motions were pending and were nearly fully briefed, it denied the motion without prejudice and stated that Sullivan could renew it after those dismissal motions were resolved.

For the second motion, Dkt. No. 80, Sullivan sought changes to his First Amended Complaint, including changes to the requested compensatory damages, dates, omitted defendants’ names, allegedly misnamed parties, and certain wording. The court likewise treated the request as a motion for leave to amend under Rule 15(a), rather than a Rule 60(a) correction. It denied the motion without prejudice and stated that Sullivan could renew it after the court resolved the pending dismissal motions.

Disposition

The court denied with prejudice the two judicial-notice motions, Dkt. Nos. 30 and 69. It denied without prejudice the motion for a stay, Dkt. No. 72, and the two motions to “correct the record,” Dkt. Nos. 75 and 80. The Clerk was directed to terminate the listed motions, including Dkt. No. 43, which the opinion states had already been resolved by an earlier order as moot after Sullivan amended his complaint.